





BITING WITHOUT TEETH:  THE CITIZEN SUBMISSION 
PROCESS AND ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION 
BRADLEY N. LEWIS†
 
The Dominican Republic-Central American-United States Free 
Trade Agreement (CAFTA-DR),1 recently ratified by the U.S. Con-
gress2 and signed by the President,3 has been a controversial piece of 
the Bush administration’s economic policy.  The treaty is principally 
aimed at expanding the market for U.S. business opportunities within 
the region and facilitating economic development in Central America 
and the Dominican Republic,4 but its critics5 charge that its environ-
† J.D. Candidate 2007, University of Pennsylvania Law School; B.A. 2003, Univer-
sity of Kansas.  Many thanks to Professors William Burke-White, David Skeel, and Curtis 
R. Reitz for their insightful criticism and guidance.  I am also grateful to Rebecca 
Santoro, Michelle Peters, Robin Allan, and the editors of the University of Pennsylvania 
Law Review, who contributed their time and patience to this project.  As with all of my 
life’s accomplishments, this Comment would not have been possible without the sup-
port and encouragement of my wife Amy, my parents, and my brothers.  All errors that 
remain are my own. 
1 Dominican Republic-Central America-United States Free Trade Agreement, 
U.S.-Costa Rica-Dom. Rep.-El Sal.-Guat.-Hond.-Nicar., Jan. 28, 2004, 43 I.L.M. 514  
(draft text) [hereinafter CAFTA-DR].  The most recent text of the Agreement, signed 
by the seven signatories on August 5, 2004, and to which this Comment refers, is 
avaiable at http://ustr.gov/Trade_Agreements/Bilateral/CAFTA/CAFTA-DR_Final_Texts/ 
Section_Index.html. 
2 See Dominican Republic-Central America-United States Free Trade Agreement 
Implementation Act, S. 1307, 109th Cong. § 101 (2005) (enacted) (expressing Senate 
approval of CAFTA-DR); Dominican Republic-Central America-United States Free 
Trade Agreement Implementation Act, H.R. 3045, 109th Cong. § 101 (2005) (en-
acted) (expressing House approval of CAFTA-DR).  CAFTA-DR was negotiated and 
ratified under the “fast track” authority granted to the President in the Bipartisan 
Trade Promotion Authority Act of 2002.  Pub. L. No. 107-210, div. B, tit. XXI, §§ 2101-
2113, 116 Stat. 933 (codified at 19 U.S.C. §§ 3801-3813 (Supp. II 2002)); see infra note 
130 (explaining fast track legislation). 
3 Press Release, White House, President Signs CAFTA-DR (Aug. 2, 2005), available 
at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2005/08/20050802-2.html. 
4 See CAFTA-DR, supra note 1, pmbl. (identifying these among the goals of the 
treaty); Press Release, White House, supra note 3 (same). 
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mental chapter6 is toothless—that the citizen submission process7 
lacks sufficient standards and enforcement mechanisms to avoid 
derogation by the treaty’s member states in the area of environmental 
protection.8  This Comment suggests that such despair is premature. 
5 See, e.g., Sierra Club, CAFTA’s Impact on Central America’s Environment, 
http://www.sierraclub.org/trade/cafta/cafta_centralamerica.asp (last visited Mar. 23, 
2007) (focusing on the lack of binding authority to enforce CAFTA’s “environmen-
tally-friendly language”).  Some authors also claim that the North American Agree-
ment on Environmental Cooperation (NAAEC), the Environmental Side Agreement 
to the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), which provides similar dis-
pute resolution structures to those in CAFTA-DR, compare CAFTA-DR, supra note 1, 
arts. 17.7-.8 & 20 with North American Agreement on Environmental Cooperation, 
U.S.-Can.-Mex., arts. 14, 15 & pt. 5, Sept. 8-14, 1993, 32 I.L.M. 1480 [hereinafter 
NAAEC] (authorizing complaints to the Secretariat that a party is not enforcing its en-
vironmental laws and establishing dispute settlement procedures), includes inadequate 
protections for environmental and labor interests.  See, e.g., Paul Stanton Kibel, The Pa-
per Tiger Awakens:  North American Environmental Law After the Cozumel Reef Case, 39 
COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 395, 479 (2001) (proposing that North American environ-
mental law be enforced on par with North American trade law).  But see Kal Raustiala, 
The Political Implications of the Enforcement Provisions of the NAFTA Environmental Side 
Agreement:  The CFC as a Model for Future Accords, 25 ENVTL. L. 31, 56 (1995) (arguing 
that the use of NAAEC-type provisions can actually reduce environmental regulation).  
CAFTA-DR, similar to NAFTA, arguably provides less protection to labor interests than 
to environmental interests. See CAFTA-DR, supra note 1, art. 16 (failing to provide an 
analog to the environmental submission procedure for labor interests); North Ameri-
can Agreement on Labor Cooperation, U.S.-Can.-Mex., Sept. 8-14, 1993, 32 I.L.M. 
1499 (same). 
6 See CAFTA-DR, supra note 1, art. 17 (affirming the importance of environmental 
protections and establishing enforcement processes). 
7 See infra Part I.C.2 (describing the citizen submission process). 
8 The United States, see supra notes 2-3, the Dominican Republic, El Salvador, 
Honduras, Guatemala, and Nicaragua have ratified the treaty.  See Jenalia Moreno, El 
Salvador on Board with CAFTA:  First Central American Nation To Implement Pact, HOUST. 
CHRON., Feb. 25, 2006, at D1 (“Four other nations [apart from El Salvador] involved in 
the trade talks—Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua, and the Dominican Republic—are 
still making legislative and regulatory changes to adhere to the agreement.  However, 
Costa Rica’s legislature has still not ratified the deal.”).  CAFTA-DR will enter into 
force upon the agreement of the signatories, see CAFTA-DR, supra note 1, arts. 
22.5(1)(b), 22.5(2) (stipulating that the treaty will enter into force once the United 
States and another of the signatories agree on a date; remaining signatories may join 
enforcement ninety days after completing certain formalities), and El Salvador has be-
come the first of the signatories to implement the agreement with the United States, 
see Moreno, supra (stating that the agreement was to take effect between the United 
States and El Salvador on March 1, 2006).  The Bush administration has been pressur-
ing the holdouts by making known its intent and desire to bring the treaty into force as 
soon as possible.  See Rick Eyerdam, U.S. Set To Act on CAFTA, J. COM. ONLINE, Dec. 20, 
2005, available at 2005 WLNR 20630366 (“The United States is prepared to implement 
[CAFTA-DR] once [the other signatories] ‘have taken sufficient steps to complete 
their commitments’ under the trade pact, says Christin Baker, spokesperson of the Of-
fice of the U.S. Trade Representative.”).  CAFTA-DR has become politically divisive in 
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Similar protests9 were lodged against the analogous provisions of 
the North American Agreement on Environmental Cooperation 
(NAAEC), the side agreement to the North American Free Trade 
Agreement (NAFTA).10  The critics’ arguments have merit; these trea-
ties protect foreign investors11 and trade interests12 by establishing uni-
form international standards and binding enforcement measures 
without including similar environmental provisions,13 thus creating 
the possibility of a race to the bottom among member states as they 
erode environmental protections to compete for investment and 
trade.  Nevertheless, despite the disequilibrium between the invest-
ment and trade provisions on the one hand, and the environmental 
provisions on the other, the record of environmental submissions un-
der NAAEC demonstrates that these supposedly toothless environ-
mental provisions can actually substantially offset the tendency toward 
an environmental race to the bottom that these treaties could other-
wise create. 
Costa Rica, which has yet to ratify the treaty.  See Olga R. Rodriguez, Arias Holds Slim 
Lead in Costa Rica Election, PHILA. INQUIRER, Feb. 7, 2006, at A10 (noting that the previ-
ous frontrunner, Oscar Arias Sanchez, was down to “a razor-thin lead” partially due to 
his support for CAFTA-DR). 
9 See, e.g., Jonathan Graubart, Giving Meaning to New Trade-Linked “Soft Law” Agree-
ments on Social Values:  A Law-in-Action Analysis of NAFTA’s Environmental Side Agreement, 
6 UCLA J. INT’L L. & FOREIGN AFF. 425, 426 (2001-2002) (“[A]ctivists have creatively 
used the nonbinding citizen submissions to place added political pressure on their 
home governments and thereby boost ongoing political and legal campaigns at home 
on such issues as protecting fish habitat and stopping the continuous dumping of toxic 
wastes.”); Kibel, supra note 5, at 395 (“[NAFTA] is treated as binding and enforceable, 
whereas [NAAEC] is treated as non-binding and aspirational.”); Kal Raustiala, Police 
Patrols and Fire Alarms in the NAAEC, 26 LOY. L.A. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 389, 389-90 
(2004) (arguing that the NAAEC citizen submission process regulates signatory com-
pliance via “police controls” (review by a centralized bureaucracy) and “fire alarms” 
(investigations triggered by private actors)). 
10 NAAEC, supra note 5, art. 1; North American Free Trade Agreement, U.S.-Can.-
Mex., Dec. 17, 1992, 32 I.L.M. 289 (1993) [hereinafter NAFTA].  NAAEC was an essen-
tial addendum to the NAFTA treaty regime, and their memberships are coterminous. 
11 See CAFTA-DR, supra note 1, art. 10.5, 10.15-.27 (providing a “minimum stan-
dard of treatment” for investments and allowing for investing parties to institute arbi-
tration proceedings against CAFTA-DR signatories); NAFTA, supra note 10, arts. 1105, 
1115-1120 (same). 
12 See CAFTA-DR, supra note 1, art. 3 (stipulating the removal or reduction of vari-
ous barriers to trade); NAFTA, supra note 10, pt. II (same). 
13 Compare Parts I.A & I.B, infra, with Part I.C, infra.  Domestic labor standards are 
similarly endangered by CAFTA-DR, but because the internal politics and international 
treatment of the issue are sufficiently dissimilar to those of environmental concerns, 
the labor law analysis falls outside the scope of this Comment. 
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To prevent such a race, it is sufficient to establish uniform inter-
national standards and an effective means for deterring states from 
noncompliance with those standards, but these terms need not be ex-
plicit in the treaty’s text.  Indeed, given the tenor of international en-
vironmental law in general,14 and the preferences of the United States 
in particular,15 such explicitly strong environmental terms would likely 
prevent ratification.  The solution must instead achieve the necessary 
environmental protections in a politically acceptable manner, and this 
Comment argues that in the hands of nongovernmental organizations 
(NGOs) acting strategically, the regime established by NAAEC and, by 
extension, CAFTA-DR’s environmental chapter, will do just that. 
In its analysis, this Comment employs Kal Raustiala’s conception 
of international agreements as having three conceptually distinct fea-
tures, two dealing with form—legality and structure—and one address-
ing substance.16  According to Raustiala, legality refers to the formality 
with which an international agreement creates an international legal 
obligation, varying from legally binding contracts to nonlegally binding 
pledges.17  Raustiala uses structure to measure the effectiveness of the 
agreement’s enforcement mechanisms; an agreement can be either 
weak or strong in this regard.18  Finally, the substance of an agreement 
refers to the coercive nature of its obligations and can range from deep 
14 See Kal Raustiala, Form and Substance in International Agreements, 99 AM. J. INT’L L. 
581, 601 (2005) (“Many scholars have noted the variety in depth of international 
agreements.  Environmental accords, for example, are often shallow.  Trade agree-
ments are generally thought to be deeper, as are many arms control accords.”). 
15 See infra notes 116-135 and accompanying text. 
16 See Raustiala, supra note 14, at 581.  Using these factors to establish a rational 
delineation between “hard” and “soft” law, Raustiala argues that 
the notion of “soft law” agreements is incoherent.  Under the prevailing ap-
proach, pledges are being smuggled into the international lawyer’s repertoire 
by dubbing them soft law.  Just as frequently, scholars declare that contracts 
containing vague or imprecise commitments are actually soft.  In so doing, 
these commentators are conflating the legality of agreements with structure 
(in particular, enforcement features) or substance (e.g., rule precision), or ef-
fects with causes (i.e., looking to behavioral effects to demonstrate interna-
tional law’s existence). 
Id. at 582.  More robust definitions of each of these three variables are addressed in 
the discussion of this paper’s analytical framework.  See infra notes 88-94 and accompa-
nying text. 
17 Raustiala, supra note 14, at 581, 583-84.  Raustiala refers to nonlegally binding 
agreements as those to which states agree without creating a formal record of the 
agreement.  Id. 
18 Id. at 585. 
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to shallow.19  Among these variables, Raustiala notes that trade-offs oc-
cur as states negotiate agreements, such that it is unusual for each of 
the three characteristics to be employed in the fullest sense in the 
same agreement.20  In environmental agreements, the trade-offs gen-
erally involve legality and substance.21  These trade-offs relate to politi-
cal feasibility:  the likelihood that contracting states will adopt and 
comply with a particular treaty provision.  Agreements that reflect 
trade-offs are likely to enjoy political feasibility.   
In these terms, this Comment argues that while the environmental 
provisions of NAAEC and CAFTA-DR are legally contractual and 
structurally strong, they cannot be substantively deep without becom-
ing politically infeasible.  Strategic NGOs, however, have the ability to 
effectively deepen the treaty’s substance while maintaining political 
feasibility by exploiting CAFTA-DR’s structural provisions.  This thesis 
has value beyond the specific NAAEC/CAFTA-DR context; it offers a 
practical understanding of the potential effectiveness that seemingly 
shallow substantive treaty provisions can have if properly understood 
by strategic political actors. 
Part I explains the identical features of NAFTA and CAFTA-DR 
that, without mitigating factors, could cause a race to the bottom by 
the signatories in enforcing their environmental standards.22  Part II 
establishes a framework for analysis of political feasibility, and then 
moves on to apply that rubric to the NAAEC/CAFTA-DR context.  
Part III then argues that by establishing a citizen submission process 
and a network of environmental regulators, the treaties’ environ-
mental provisions enable NGOs to effectively deepen the substantive 
environmental provisions to a level sufficient to address the race to 
the bottom. 
19 Id. at 584-85. 
20 See id. at 582 (claiming that domestic politics inform the choice between form 
and substance, and that “the widespread preference for contracts often unduly weak-
ens the substance and structure of multilateral agreements”). 
21 See id. at 596 (“In many areas of cooperation—such as the environment, [inter 
alia]—the preference for contracts is pervasive.  Indeed, in these areas negotiations 
that end in a pledge are often dubbed failures, while those that produce contracts, 
though subject to criticisms about substance or structure, are largely considered suc-
cesses.”). 
22 The term “environmental standards,” as used in this Comment, refers to both 
state laws and regulations in force, and to the enforcement of these rules by the proper 
state authorities. 
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I.  THE ENVIRONMENTAL RACE TO THE BOTTOM 
This Part discusses the race to the bottom in environmental pro-
tection that may result from the imbalance among the substantive23 
protections found in both NAFTA and CAFTA-DR.  The danger asso-
ciated with these treaties derives from their encouragement of re-
gional trade and investment activities via substantively deep protec-
tions while employing comparatively shallow provisions in the 
environmental chapter.  Among the explicit goals of the treaties are 
“[enhancing] the competitiveness of [the signatories’] firms in global 
markets,” “[establishing] clear and mutually advantageous rules gov-
erning . . . trade,” and “[ensuring] a predictable commercial frame-
work for business planning and investment.”24  To meet these goals, 
the treaties outline specific uniform standards to be observed with re-
gard to cross-border investment25 and trade,26 and provide for a dis-
pute resolution procedure to protect parties involved in these activi-
ties.27  Parties seeking to make environmental claims, however do not, 
enjoy similar substantive protections under CAFTA-DR and NAAEC; 
neither treaty provides international environmental standards28 nor 
an enforceable29 private right of action30 for such claims.31
23 As noted above, this Comment adopts Kal Raustiala’s terminology regarding the 
form and substance of international agreements.  Under Raustiala’s approach, the 
“substance” of an international agreement includes the provisions of that agreement 
and the extent to which they require a change in the ex ante member state practice.  See 
Raustiala, supra note 14, at 584 (noting that substantive depth is “the extent to which 
[an agreement] requires states to depart from what they would have done in its ab-
sence” (quoting George W. Downs et al., Is the Good News About Compliance Good News 
About Cooperation?, 50 INT’L ORG. 379, 383 (1996) (alteration in original))). 
24 NAFTA, supra note 10, pmbl.; CAFTA-DR, supra note 1, pmbl.  The preambles 
of these treaties indicate that these commercial goals are to be achieved in a context of 
environmental responsibility.  See NAFTA, supra note 10, pmbl. (pledging to undertake 
“each of the preceding in a manner consistent with environmental protection and con-
servation”); CAFTA-DR, supra note 1, pmbl. (seeking to protect and “preserve the envi-
ronment and enhance the means for doing so, including through the conservation of 
natural resources in their respective territories”). 
25 See infra Part I.A. 
26 See infra Part I.B. 
27 See infra Part I.A-B. 
28 See infra Part I.C.1. 
29 The term “enforceable” is inherently plastic, and as will be seen, identifies the 
substantive core of what seems to be an attack on the treaties’ structural provisions.  See 
infra notes 106-107 and accompanying text. 
30 See infra Part I.C.2. 
31 Richard Revesz identifies these as two of the obstacles to counteracting the en-
vironmental race to the bottom.  See Richard L. Revesz, Federalism and Environmental 
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This Comment focuses not on the efficacy of the environmental 
provisions in combating the baseline environmental problems, but 
rather on the treaties’ ability to counteract the derogative pressures 
introduced by the environmental race to the bottom.  As an agree-
ment involving the United States and six developing economies,32 
CAFTA-DR sets the stage for such a downward race among the Central 
American states33 that would multiply the impulse to discount domes-
tic environmental protections.  By increasing the cross-border mobility 
of investment dollars34 and goods among the member states via deep 
substantive protections, CAFTA-DR encourages the developing 
Regulation:  Lessons for the European Union and the International Community, 83 VA. L. REV. 
1331, 1341 (1997) (claiming that international environmental regulation can be diffi-
cult because the international community has only a “weak capacity for centralized en-
vironmental standard-setting and virtually no capacity for centralized environmental 
enforcement”).  Revesz also identifies the pronounced wealth gap as an additional fac-
tor that complicates international environmental regulation.  Id. (“[T]he differences 
in wealth and economic development are far more salient in the international com-
munity than in federal systems.”). 
32 See CAFTA-DR, supra note 1, pmbl. (identifying the signatories as the govern-
ments of the Republic of Costa Rica, the Dominican Republic, the Republic of El Sal-
vador, the Republic of Guatemala, the Republic of Honduras, the Republic of Nicara-
gua, and the United States of America). 
33 For brevity, I include the Dominican Republic when I refer to “Central Ameri-
can states.” 
34 Of course, these investment opportunities are currently available to domestic 
investors in the United States and other states, but the CAFTA-DR investor protection 
provisions seek to increase foreign investment by providing specific assurances to for-
eign investors.  These provisions augment the incentive for states seeking foreign in-
vestment to ignore environmental concerns in order to secure that investment.  See in-
fra Part I.A (detailing the foreign investment protections afforded under CAFTA-DR 
and NAFTA).  Only three of the CAFTA-DR signatories—El Salvador, Honduras, and 
Nicaragua—have negotiated bilateral investment treaties (BITs) with the United States 
that would afford investor protections outside of the CAFTA-DR provisions.  See United 
Nations Conference on Trade and Development, UNCTAD Investment Instruments 
Online, http://www.unctadxi.org/templates/DocSearch____779.aspx (last visited Mar. 
23, 2007) (cataloging all bilateral investment treaties).  Of these, only the BIT with 
Honduras has entered into force.  See Investment Treaty with Honduras, U.S.-Hond., 
July 1, 1995, S. TREATY DOC. NO. 106-27 (2000).  Additionally, each CAFTA-DR signa-
tory is a member of the WTO, see World Trade Organization, Understanding the 
WTO—Members and Observers, http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/ 
tif_e/org6_e.htm (last visited Mar. 23, 2007) (listing the membership of the WTO), 
and the extent to which the CAFTA-DR trade provisions will have a derogative effect 
on environmental protection is mitigated by the trade rights secured to all members of 
the WTO.  WTO, Understanding the WTO—Principles of the Trading System, 
http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/fact2_e.htm (last visited Mar. 
23, 2007) (outlining the general trading principles between member states of  
the WTO). 
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economies to compete for these newly available, but finite, sources of 
economic growth.  The danger is that this competition may incite the 
Central American states to downgrade their domestic environmental 
protections in an attempt to decrease the costs of local economic ac-
tivity, therefore attracting a greater proportion of foreign investment 
and trade.35  The Sections below detail the specific provisions in 
CAFTA-DR and NAFTA that allow the possible environmental race to 
the bottom to occur—namely, the establishment of deep substantive 
protections for trade and investment, but shallow substance in the en-
vironmental provisions. 
A.  Investor Protections 
NAFTA and CAFTA-DR provide deep substantive protections to 
investment interests by setting standards to be achieved by host states 
with regard to foreign investment,36 and establishing a dispute resolu-
tion procedure to which private interested parties have access and 
from which they may seek an enforceable decision.37  The scope and 
quality of these protections indicate the signatories’ intent to assure 
investors that they will have the opportunity to litigate any grievances 
that may arise from their foreign investment, thus encouraging free-
35 Cf. Richard L. Revesz, Federalism and Interstate Environmental Externalities, 144 U. 
PA. L. REV. 2341, 2343 (1996) (arguing that in the federal context, a justification for 
federal environmental regulation is that it removes the temptation for states to “induce 
geographically mobile firms to locate within their jurisdictions” by offering “them 
suboptimally lax environmental standards so as to benefit from additional jobs and tax 
revenues”). 
36 See CAFTA-DR, supra note 1, art. 10.3-.14 (providing for various substantive pro-
tections for investing parties); NAFTA, supra note 10, pt. II (same). 
37 See CAFTA-DR, supra note 1, art. 10.15-.27 (providing for arbitration procedures 
at the behest of foreign investors against the state of investment); NAFTA, supra note 
10, ch. 20 (addressing institutional arrangements and dispute settlement procedures).  
Similar investor rights were established in the NAFTA treaty.  See NAFTA, supra note 
10, arts. 1115-1138 (allowing investors to bring arbitration proceedings against the 
state of investment).  Some activists have seized upon this imbalance of private access 
to dispute resolution as grounds for opposing CAFTA-DR altogether.  See, e.g., Press 
Release, Sierra Club, Response to the U.S.-Central American Environmental Coopera-
tion Agreement (ECA):  Statement by Margrete Strand, Senior Representative of the 
Sierra Club’s Responsible Trade Program (Feb. 24, 2005), available at 
http://www.sierraclub.org/pressroom/releases/pr2005-02-24.asp (“CAFTA follows the 
failed path of NAFTA and expands the ability of multinational corporations to chal-
lenge environmental and public health measures in secret trade tribunals for cash 
compensation.”). 
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dom of capital among member states.38  In short, these provisions aim 
to promote cross-border investment by creating nonpreferential, uni-
form standards of protection.39
Both treaties afford investors the benefits of national treatment,40 
most-favored-nation status,41 and minimum standards of treatment.42  
Each of these provisions exemplifies the definite and binding quality 
of investor protections, which must be uniformly adopted and en-
forced against each signatory.  The national treatment article ensures 
that foreign investors enjoy the same protections that benefit domes-
tic investors,43 and the most-favored-nation article assures signatories’ 
investors that no other international investors will enjoy extra protec-
tions or assurances not available to investors from signatory states.44  
In addition to these comparative investor protections, the treaty also 
establishes minimum standards for investors, guaranteeing those pro-
tections “in accordance with customary international law, including 
fair and equitable treatment and full protection and security.”45
38 See CAFTA-DR, supra note 1, pmbl. (listing the overall goals of the agreement, 
which include the promotion of economic integration between the member states); 
NAFTA, supra note 10, art. 102 (declaring that NAFTA aims to “eliminate barriers to 
trade in, and facilitate the cross-border movement of, goods and services between the 
territories of the Parties” and to “create effective procedures” for implementing the 
agreement and its objectives, including procedures to resolve disputes between mem-
ber states). 
39 For an analysis of the unequal procedural protections afforded to investors and 
environmental interests in the NAFTA/NAAEC context, see Chris Tollefson, Games 
Without Frontiers:  Investor Claims and Citizen Submissions Under the NAFTA Regime, 27 YALE 
J. INT’L L. 141, 146-47 (2002). 
40 CAFTA-DR, supra note 1, art. 10.3; NAFTA, supra note 10, art. 1102. 
41 CAFTA-DR, supra note 1, art. 10.4; NAFTA, supra note 10, art. 1103. 
42 CAFTA-DR, supra note 1, art. 10.5; NAFTA, supra note 10, art. 1105. 
43 See CAFTA-DR, supra note 1, art. 10.3(1) (“Each Party shall accord to investors 
of another Party treatment no less favorable than that it accords, in like circumstances, 
to its own investors with respect to . . . investments in its territory.”); NAFTA, supra note 
10, art. 1102(1) (including a similar provision). 
44 See CAFTA-DR, supra note 1, art. 10.4(1) (“Each Party shall accord to investors 
of another Party treatment no less favorable than that it accords, in like circumstances, 
to investors of any other Party or of any non-Party with respect to . . . investments in its 
territory.”); NAFTA, supra note 10, art. 1103(1) (including a similar provision). 
45 CAFTA-DR, supra note 1, art. 10.5(1).  These terms are further defined in sub-
sequent sections to include access to judicial proceedings and a baseline level of police 
protection.  See CAFTA-DR, supra note 1, art. 10.5(2)(a)-(b). The NAFTA minimum 
standards are phrased differently.  See NAFTA, supra note 10, art. 1105(1) (“Each Party 
shall accord to investments of investors of another Party treatment in accordance with 
international law, including fair and equitable treatment and full protection and secu-
rity.”). 
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The investment provisions also give explicit procedural rights to 
private foreign investors,46 allowing them to bring timely47 claims 
against the host state itself48 for a breach of a substantive duty con-
ferred by NAFTA, CAFTA-DR, or an investment authorization or 
agreement.49  Initially, disputes are to be addressed via informal “con-
sultation and negotiation,”50 but if these prove unsuccessful, the ag-
grieved investor is allowed to institute arbitration proceedings against 
the state under the International Centre for Settlement of Investment 
Disputes (ICSID) or the United Nations Commission on International 
Trade Law (UNCITRAL) Rules.51  These arbitration proceedings, if 
they yield a favorable decision for the complainant, result in a binding 
cash award or restitution to the private party,52 which can then be en-
46 Claimants can bring an action either on their own behalf or derivatively on be-
half of a corporation.  CAFTA-DR, supra note 1, art. 10.16(1)(a)-(b); NAFTA, supra 
note 10, arts. 1115-1138.  These claims must have resulted in harm to the claimant.  
CAFTA-DR, supra note 1, art. 10.16(1)(a)(ii), (b)(ii); NAFTA, supra note 10, art. 
1116(1). 
47 See CAFTA-DR, supra note 1, art. 10.18(1) (stating that claims must be “submit-
ted to arbitration” within “three years [of] the date on which the claimant first ac-
quired, or should have first acquired, knowledge of the breach alleged . . . and knowl-
edge that the claimant . . . or the enterprise . . . has incurred loss or damage”); NAFTA, 
supra note 10, art. 1116(2) (“An investor may not make a claim if more than three 
years have elapsed from the date on which the investor first acquired, or should have 
first acquired, knowledge of the alleged breach and knowledge that the investor has 
incurred loss or damage.”). 
48 In these investment cases, the substantive obligations owed to the foreign inves-
tor, see supra notes 40-45 and accompanying text, are assurances of legal treatment within 
the host state.  Therefore, a breach of these obligations would entail a change in the 
laws of the host state, thus rendering the state itself the appropriate target of litigation. 
49 CAFTA-DR, supra note 1, art. 10.16(1)(a)(i), (1)(b)(i). 
50 Id. art. 10.15. 
51 Id. art. 10.16(3); NAFTA, supra note 10, art. 1120.  If both the respondent’s and 
the investor’s home states are signatories to the ICSID Convention, then that Conven-
tion and the ICSID Rules of Procedures for Arbitration Proceedings govern the dis-
pute.  CAFTA-DR, supra note 1, art. 10.16(3)(a); NAFTA, supra note 10, art. 
1120(1)(a).  If only one of the two states involved has signed the ICSID Convention, 
the ICSID Additional Facility Rules will apply.  CAFTA-DR, supra note 1, art. 
10.16(3)(b); NAFTA, supra note 10, art. 1120(1)(b).  Finally, if neither state is party to 
the ICSID Convention, the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules will be used.  CAFTA-DR, 
supra note 1, art. 10.16(3)(c); NAFTA, supra note 10, art. 1120(1)(c).  ICSID and 
UNCITRAL are systems of ready-made arbitration rules allowing for private parties to 
make claims against states for breaching agreements.  See generally INT’L CENTRE FOR 
SETTLEMENT OF INV. DISPUTES, ICSID CONVENTION, REGULATIONS, AND RULES, (Apr. 
10, 2006), available at http://www.worldbank.org/icsid/basicdoc/basicdoc.htm; Con-
vention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, June 10, 
1958, 21 U.S.T. 2517, 330 U.N.T.S. 38. 
52 CAFTA-DR, supra note 1, art. 10.26(1)(a)-(b); NAFTA, supra note 10, art. 1135. 
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forced under the NAFTA or CAFTA-DR dispute resolution chapters, 
or various other international agreements.53
These investment protections indicate that all signatories—both 
developed and developing—find it beneficial to protect investors’ 
rights under these treaties.  U.S. investors seek valuable opportunities 
with minimal risk, and the protections described in the NAFTA and 
CAFTA-DR investment chapters allay investor worries by establishing 
both a uniform baseline of investor entitlements as well as a reliable 
enforcement procedure.  Conversely, signatories with developing 
economies benefit from these investor protections because they help 
attract investment dollars and thereby spur economic stability and 
growth.54
B.  Trade Protections 
As in the investment context, both NAFTA and CAFTA-DR pro-
vide deep substantive protection through explicit trade standards, as 
well as a dispute resolution process for trade grievances that may pro-
vide enforceable results.  Similar to the investment provisions, these 
trade provisions are in the mutual interest of the signatories, encour-
aging broader markets for domestic goods.  By agreeing to this re-
gime, however, states with weak domestic businesses put these firms at 
risk of failing because of increased market competition with firms 
from other treaty member states. 
While the treaties include situational trade rules,55 the baseline 
protections are similar to those rules established in the investment 
context.  Regarding trade in goods, each signatory must ensure that 
53 CAFTA-DR, supra note 1, art. 10.26(6), (8), (9); NAFTA, supra note 10, art. 
1136.  Once a plaintiff obtains a decision in her favor from one of these arenas, she 
can then enforce that decision in the defendant state’s domestic court system. 
54 Costa Rica, the Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, and 
Nicaragua each stand to benefit economically by providing investor protections to the 
United States.  Foreign direct investment (FDI), the cross-border “investment by one 
firm in another with the intention of gaining a degree of control over that firm’s op-
erations,” PETER DICKEN, GLOBAL SHIFT:  RESHAPING THE GLOBAL ECONOMIC MAP IN 
THE 21ST CENTURY 51 (4th ed. 2003), is a means for enlarging a state’s domestic econ-
omy via corporate mergers and asset sharing.  The United States is a leading source of 
FDI, and the six other parties to CAFTA-DR rank among the lowest in amounts of FDI 
received.  See id. at 55 fig.3.14 (depicting the global distribution of both outbound and 
inbound FDI). 
55 See, e.g., CAFTA-DR, supra note 1, art. 3.5-.29 (governing various trade circum-
stances among the signatories); NAFTA, supra note 10, chs. 4-8 (same). 
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the others’ firms will enjoy national treatment,56 and the parties have 
agreed to scheduled tariff rollbacks on products originating from 
other member states.57  The provision on trade in services includes as-
surances of national treatment,58 most favored nation status,59 and the 
guarantee that local incorporation will not be required for a service 
provider to do business within a signatory’s borders.60
The trade chapters of these treaties do not indicate a specific pro-
cedure for the assertion of trade rights; therefore the overall dispute 
resolution procedures control any trade-based controversies.61  Under 
the respective dispute resolution provisions, the complaining state62 
may decide whether to bring the action under the NAFTA/CAFTA-
DR procedure, the WTO Agreement, or other “free trade agree-
ment[s] to which the disputing Parties” belong.63  These choices af-
ford the complaining state access to an arbitration process that would 
enable a successful plaintiff to enforce its rights through a propor-
tionate64 suspension in trade rights until restitution is made.65
56 CAFTA-DR, supra note 1, art. 3.2; NAFTA, supra note 10, art. 301. 
57 CAFTA-DR, supra note 1, art. 3.3; NAFTA, supra note 10, art. 302. 
58 CAFTA-DR, supra note 1, art. 11.2; NAFTA, supra note 10, art. 1202; see also supra 
notes 40, 43, 56 and accompanying text. 
59 CAFTA-DR, supra note 1, art. 11.3; NAFTA, supra note 10, art. 1203. 
60 CAFTA-DR, supra note 1, art. 11.5; NAFTA, supra note 10, art. 1205. 
61 See CAFTA-DR, supra note 1, art. 20.2; NAFTA, supra note 10, art. 2004; see also 
CAFTA-DR, supra note 1, annex 20.2 (providing explicit recourse to the article 20 pro-
cedure for instances of “nullification” of provisions in articles 3 and 11, inter alia). 
62 In this dispute resolution context, “[p]arty means any State for which this 
Agreement is in force.”  CAFTA-DR, supra note 1, art. 2.1.  This definition is implicit in 
the NAFTA definitions.  See NAFTA, supra note 10, art. 201 (stating, for example, that a 
“person of a Party means a national, or an enterprise, of a party”).  Therefore, private 
parties—namely individuals and private organizations—have no standing under Chap-
ter 20, and must instead rely on diplomatic protection to assert any trade-based claims.  
See, e.g., Nottebohm Case (Liecht. v. Guat.) 1955 I.C.J. 4, 26 (Apr. 6) (requiring state 
espousal of individual claims as a prerequisite for litigation in international tribunals). 
63 CAFTA-DR, supra note 1, art. 20.3(1).  The NAFTA agreement only references 
the WTO proceedings as alternatives.  See NAFTA, supra note 10, art. 2005 (stating that 
parties have recourse to GATT settlement procedures). 
64 See WORLD TRADE ORG., UNDERSTANDING THE WTO 62 (2005), available at 
http://www.wto.org/English/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/understanding_text_e.pdf (de-
scribing the circumstances under which an aggrieved party may institute trade sanc-
tions against a party failing to make restitution). 
65 See CAFTA-DR, supra note 1, art. 20.16 (allowing for the proportional suspen-
sion of trade benefits by the complainant against the noncompliant party if the com-
plainant has not received restitution); NAFTA, supra note 10, art. 2019 (same).  For a 
definition of proportionality as used in this context, see UNDERSTANDING THE WTO, 
supra note 64, at 62 (noting that sanctions should be limited to avoid impinging on 
other sectors of trade). 
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The provisions for trade protection, though slightly different, re-
main indicative of a strong signatory commitment to the enforcement 
of trade rights.  Substantively, the effect of these protections is similar 
to those on the investment side, guaranteeing a minimum interna-
tional standard of treatment to incoming goods and services.66  The 
main difference from the investment chapter is the dispute resolution 
process.  Here, private parties must convince an eligible state to es-
pouse the claim in order to gain access to international adjudication.67
C.  Environmental Protections 
Unlike the investment and trade provisions, the NAAEC and 
CAFTA-DR environmental protection schemes seem substantively 
shallow:  they provide neither an international standard for environ-
mental protection, nor a dispute resolution process by which private 
parties seeking to enjoin or punish environmental malfeasance may 
sue for an order stating such events have occurred.  These deficien-
cies give rise to specific holes in environmental protection that must 
be remedied if the chapter is to allay its detractors’ concerns and ef-
fectively combat the pressures detrimental to the environment intro-
duced by the deep substance of the treaties’ investment and trade 
provisions. 
1.  Lacking International Environmental Standards 
Neither treaty establishes hortatory environmental standards; they 
instead require only that the member states “effectively enforce [their 
own] environmental laws.”68  This stipulation is further weakened by 
the treaties’ “recogni[tion] that each [member state] retains the right 
to exercise discretion with respect to investigatory, prosecutorial, 
regulatory, and compliance matters and to make decisions regarding 
the allocation of resources.”69  CAFTA-DR does not completely ignore 
66 The trade-in-goods provisions do not secure most favored nation status among 
the signatories, but the rollbacks of tariffs do provide an international rule that is not 
subject to domestic policy choices. 
67 International adjudication, by definition, allows only states to be party to an ac-
tion.  See infra note 137 and accompanying text. 
68 CAFTA-DR, supra note 1, art. 17.2.1(a); see also NAAEC, supra note 5, art. 5.1 
(stating essentially the same proposition). 
69 CAFTA-DR, supra note 1, art. 17.2.1(b); see also NAAEC, supra note 5, pmbl. 
(“Reaffirming the sovereign right of States to exploit their own resources pursuant to 
their own environmental and development policies . . . .”). 
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the possibility of opportunistic behavior, reminding the signatories 
that 
it is inappropriate to encourage trade or investment by weakening or re-
ducing the protections afforded in domestic environmental laws.  Ac-
cordingly, each Party shall strive to ensure that it does not waive or oth-
erwise derogate from, or offer to waive or otherwise derogate from, such 
laws in a manner that weakens or reduces the protections afforded in 
those laws as an encouragement for trade with another [signatory], or as 
an encouragement for the establishment, acquisition, expansion, or re-
tention of an investment in its territory.
70
This precatory standard, generally referred to as “aspirational,” 
provides little international accountability to environmental protec-
tion.  Because the signatories commit only to “strive” to enforce their 
own environmental standards,  complete adherence is unnecessary.  If 
the domestic government decides that its environmental laws and 
regulations are too stringent to allow economic growth, it retains the 
ability under this treaty regime to unilaterally reduce its environ-
mental protection efforts,71 free from enforceable sanction.  As com-
pared to the treaty-based standards provided in the chapters on in-
vestment and trade, the sovereignty retained by the signatory 
governments in the environmental context provides a clear opportu-
nity for each member state to sacrifice environmental protection as 
they pursue economic growth, thus fueling the environmental race to 
the bottom. 
2.  Lacking an Enforceable Private Right of Action 
Unlike the investment and trade provisions, the environmental 
citizen submission process does not guarantee an enforceable right of 
action to private parties; the outcome of a citizen submission will have 
no legally binding effect on any member state.72  In order to make a 
submission under this enforcement procedure, a private party73 must 
70 CAFTA-DR, supra note 1, art. 17.2.2. 
71 Of course, the decision to reduce legal environmental protection is subject to 
any internal legislative and regulatory processes that may exist. 
72 See CAFTA-DR, supra note 1, art. 17.8 (stipulating that “publication of the fac-
tual record is the end result of a successful submission”); NAAEC, supra note 5, art. 15 
(same). 
73 Potential parties under these environmental provisions include both natural 
and legal persons, indicating that individuals or organizations would be able to bring 
submissions under this chapter, regardless of their relation to the harm alleged.  See 
CAFTA-DR, supra note 1, art. 17.7(1), (2)(f) (limiting possible claimants to those who 
hold status as “a person of a Party”); NAAEC, supra note 5, art. 14.1(f) (providing for 
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claim against a fellow NAAEC or CAFTA-DR signatory74 that the state 
has failed to “effectively enforce its environmental laws.”75  After satis-
fying basic procedural requirements,76 the party must submit its claim 
to the treaty’s secretariat77 for consideration.  This official has the dis-
cretion to reject the submission as frivolous, or to proceed with the 
inquiry by asking the state complained against for a response.78  After 
receiving the response, the secretariat, if convinced that the issue is 
credible, may ask permission of the treaty’s Environmental Affairs 
Council79 to proceed with the production of a factual record.80  Be-
cause these Councils are composed of domestic administration offi-
cials from each signatory, the individual’s claim of environmental 
claims by a “person or organization residing or established in the territory of a party”).  
Other signatories are allowed to instigate consultations regarding environmental 
nonenforcement, which could eventually lead to Chapter 20 arbitration between two 
member states.  See CAFTA-DR, supra note 1, art. 17.10(1), (6), (8) (establishing the 
procedure for collaborative environmental consultations); NAAEC, supra note 5, art. 
22 (same).  The NAAEC consultation provision has never been used.  E.g., Kibel, supra 
note 5, at 416 n.104 (stating that the Article 22 mechanism “remains untested” (quot-
ing David Lopez, Dispute Resolution Under NAFTA:  Lessons from the Early Experience, 32 
TEX. INT’L L.J. 163, 188 (1997)). 
74 CAFTA-DR, supra note 1, art. 17.7(3); NAAEC, supra note 5, art. 14.1. 
75 CAFTA-DR, supra note 1, art. 17.7(1), (3); NAAEC, supra note 5, art. 14.1. 
76 See CAFTA-DR, supra note 1, art. 17.7(2)(a)-(f) (requiring the complainant’s 
identification, a sufficient level of evidence, and a showing of genuine grievance, inter 
alia); NAAEC, supra note 5, art. 14.1(a)-(f) (providing essentially the same procedural 
requirements). 
77 CAFTA-DR, supra note 1, art. 17.7(1); NAAEC, supra note 5,  art. 14.  The 
CAFTA-DR secretariat’s powers are not explicitly delineated, but presumably the posi-
tion is similar to the NAAEC secretariat.  Compare CAFTA-DR supra note 1, art. 17.7(1) 
& n.1, (4) (designating a secretariat and giving it powers to determine if a submission 
merits a response from a party), with NAAEC, supra note 5, arts. 11-15 (describing the 
duties of the NAAEC secretariat). 
78 CAFTA-DR, supra note 1, art. 17.7(4); NAAEC, supra note 5, art. 14.2.  The cri-
teria for rejecting the submission appear in sections (a)-(d) of articles 17.7(4) and 
14.2, respectively. 
79 An Environmental Affairs Council is a group comprised of “cabinet-level or 
equivalent representatives of the Parties, or their designees.”  CAFTA-DR, supra note 1, 
art. 17.5(1); NAAEC, supra note 5, art. 9.1 (same).  This Council is a network of high-
level government officials, experienced in the area of environmental regulation, and 
politically accountable to the signatory government that they represent.  For an expert 
discussion of the power of such regulatory networks, see ANNE-MARIE SLAUGHTER, A 
NEW WORLD ORDER 36-64 (2004) (describing regulators’ roles in the disaggregated 
international system). 
80 CAFTA-DR, supra note 1, art. 17.8(1)-(2); NAAEC, supra note 5, art. 15.1-.2.  
The Environmental Affairs Council may approve the preparation of a factual record 
“by a vote of any Party,” CAFTA-DR, supra note 1, art. 17.8(2), or by a “two-thirds vote,” 
NAAEC, supra note 5, art. 15.2. 
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nonenforcement is vulnerable to a politically motivated refusal to al-
low the factual record to be produced.81
If authorized, the secretariat then commences an investigation 
into the events giving rise to the submission, and may consult informa-
tion from a variety of sources, including “interested persons” or “in-
dependent experts.”82  Once completed, a draft of the factual record 
must be submitted for review by the Environmental Affairs Council, 
which will allow any signatory to comment.83  Having received com-
ments, the secretariat then prepares a final draft of the factual record, 
which the Environmental Affairs Council can, within sixty days, ap-
prove for publication.84  A successful citizen submission culminates 
with the publication of a factual record detailing the environmental 
harms caused by lax or absent governmental oversight or remedy.  
The factual record can include no legal judgment as to whether the 
state failed to enforce its environmental laws or regulations.85  There is 
no provision forcing the offending governmental actors to remedy the 
81 CAFTA-DR, supra note 1, art. 17.8(2), (7) (requiring a vote of the members of 
the Council before ordering the production of a factual record); NAAEC, supra note 5, 
art. 15.7 (same). 
82 CAFTA-DR, supra note 1, art. 17.8(4); NAAEC, supra note 5, art. 15.4 (similar). 
83 The commenter need not be a party to the issue, but these comments must be 
made within 45 days of the draft’s submission to the Environmental Affairs Council.  
CAFTA-DR, supra note 1, art. 17.8(5); NAAEC, supra note 5, art. 15.5. 
84 The Environmental Affairs Council may, for any reason, deny publication of the 
factual record by refusing to hold a vote.  See CAFTA-DR, supra note 1, art. 17.8(7) (re-
quiring a “vote of any Party” to authorize publication of a factual record); NAAEC, su-
pra note 5, art. 15.7 (requiring a two-thirds vote).  Under CAFTA-DR, the Environ-
mental Affairs Council’s decision to allow publication of the Factual Record must 
“consider the final factual record in light of the objectives of [Article 17] and the 
ECA.”  CAFTA-DR, supra note 1, art 17.8(8).  The “ECA” is the Environmental Coop-
eration Agreement, a side agreement to CAFTA-DR outlining a set of nonbinding en-
vironmental goals, and establishing the “Dominican Republic-Central America-United 
States Environmental Cooperation Commission” (Environmental Cooperation Com-
mission).  See generally Dominican Republic-Central America-United States Environ-
mental Cooperation Agreement, available at http://www.state.gov/g/oes/rls/or/ 
42423.htm (last visited Mar. 23, 2007) [hereinafter ECA].  The Environmental Coop-
eration Commission, like the Environmental Affairs Council, is composed of environ-
mental officials from each signatory, but its powers are only consultative.  Id. art. IV.  
Instead of, or in conjunction with, authorization of the factual record, the Environ-
mental Affairs Council may recommend action to the Environmental Cooperation 
Commission to resolve the conflict.  CAFTA-DR, supra note 1, art. 17.8(8).  NAAEC 
does not provide for an analogous commission. 
85 E.g., CAFTA-DR, supra note 1, art. 17.8 (3) (“The preparation of a factual re-
cord by the secretariat . . . shall be without prejudice to any further steps that may be 
taken with respect to any submission.”); NAAEC, supra note 5, art. 15(3) (same). 
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omission, or even requiring the provision of restitution to the parties 
harmed. 
The substantive imbalance between these treaties’ investor and 
trade protections and their environmental provisions is stark.  By pro-
viding for both internationally established standards that are immune 
from unilateral change and procedural protections leading to deci-
sions binding on the signatory governments in the context of invest-
ment and trade, the treaties confer enforceable rights to counteract 
those pressures that encourage a downward trend in environmental 
protection.  On the other hand, the shallow environmental provisions 
fail to confer comparable rights upon those seeking to redress an en-
vironmental harm.  This imbalance disadvantages environmental in-
terests.  An environmental claim against a state is undermined by the 
treaties’ deference to the domestic policymaking procedures free 
from binding international sanction.  This incongruence creates both 
the opportunity and incentive for parties to pursue economic growth 
by reducing environmental regulatory standards, thus creating a more 
attractive and profitable business environment. 
II.  TOWARD A SOLUTION 
Having highlighted the race to the bottom that these treaty re-
gimes introduce, the question becomes:  how can international law 
counteract these pressures?  This Part argues that a complete surren-
der of state sovereignty over environmental issues to an international 
body is both unlikely and unnecessary.  Although critics of the citizen 
submission process claim that it is ineffectual because it lacks both the 
conventional provisions of binding international standards and an ef-
fective private right of action to adequately prevent state participation 
in an environmental race to the bottom,86 these perceived shortcom-
ings are not fatal, and indeed may not be shortcomings at all.  As will 
be seen in Part III, it is not necessary to emulate the standards and dis-
pute resolution systems provided elsewhere in the treaty in order to 
avert the race. 
This Part considers the drawbacks of alternative regimes of envi-
ronmental dispute resolution, comparing them to the theoretical abil-
ity of the citizen submission process and its concomitant regulatory 
86 See supra note 37 (describing dispute resolution procedures and an imbalance 
of private access to dispute resolution). 
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networks to afford protection to environmental interests in 
NAFTA/NAAEC and CAFTA-DR member states.  Part I noted that a 
uniform international standard and enforceable right of action are 
key aspects of a regime that combats the environmental race to the 
bottom,87 and that these attributes are absent in the environmental 
provisions of NAAEC and CAFTA-DR.  I argue that, while such sub-
stantively deep provisions may indeed remedy the problem, they are 
not politically feasible in the context of international environmental 
law.  More effective would be a regime that achieves functional depth 
in a politically acceptable manner, and I argue that in the hands of 
politically aware environmental NGOs, such a regime regime is estab-
lished by both of these treaties. 
A.  An Analytical Framework 
To establish an analytical framework for the relative political fea-
sibility of alternative regimes of environmental regulation, it is helpful 
to begin with Raustiala’s concepts of legality, structure, and substance.  
Raustiala argues that international agreements should be examined 
across these three conceptually distinct variables, two dealing with 
form—legality and structure—and one addressing substance.88  Legal-
ity refers to the difference between contracts and pledges, which is es-
sentially whether the parties intend their agreement to create a formal 
or informal international legal obligation.89  Contracts are more for-
mal agreements, usually in writing, that purport to be binding, while 
pledges include unofficial “‘[g]entlemen’s agreements’” among state 
leaders.90  The other variable dealing with form is the agreement’s 
87 See supra Part I.C. 
88 See Raustiala, supra note 14, at 583-85 (describing the three variables in detail). 
89 Id. at 581 (“Legality refers to the choice between legally binding and nonlegally 
binding accords (for simplicity, I term this a choice between contracts and pledges).” 
(footnote omitted))  Raustiala cites language in the Vienna Convention on the Law of 
Treaties as a definition of a legally binding (contractual) treaty.  Id. at 583; see also Vi-
enna Convention on the Law of Treaties, art. 2, para. 1(a), opened for signature May 23, 
1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331 (“‘Treaty’ means an international agreement concluded be-
tween States in written form and governed by international law, whether embodied in 
a single instrument or in two or more related instruments and whatever its particular 
designation . . . .”). 
90 Raustiala, supra note 14, at 583.  Some scholars argue that legality is more than 
simply writing the provisions down in treaty form.  See, e.g., C.M. Chinkin, The Challenge 
of Soft Law:  Development and Change in International Law, 38 INT’L & COMP. L.Q. 850, 
851 (1989) (“The use of a treaty form does not of itself ensure a hard obligation . . . . 
[I]f a treaty is to be regarded as ‘hard’, it must be precisely worded and specify the ex-
act obligations undertaken or the rights granted.”).  Raustiala responds that the im-
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structure—the “rules and procedures created to monitor parties’ per-
formance”—which can be weak or strong.91  Examples of these struc-
tural provisions include both information-gathering mechanisms and 
systems designed to “deter and punish noncompliance.”92  The final 
characteristic, substance, determines whether these mechanisms affect 
compliance.93  Raustiala measures the substance of an international 
agreement by its depth, or the extent to which the agreement requires 
“‘states to depart from what they would have done in its absence.’  
Some accords are deep:  they require states to make major changes in 
policy.  Others are shallow:  they codify what states are already doing 
or demand only minor changes in behavior.”94  Based on these obser-
vations, Raustiala claims that since states generally prefer95 to comply 
with their international obligations—because they are “moderately 
risk averse” regarding uncertain future circumstances96—they usually 
require shallow substantive provisions when entering into a contrac-
tual agreement dealing with environmental issues.97  This leads to a 
trade-off between the legal and substantive aspects of an agreement. 
With Raustiala’s insights in mind, I turn to reevaluate the purpose 
of the environmental provisions and the functions they must perform 
in order to prevent an environmental race to the bottom.  It is con-
ceivable that international institutions would directly regulate the ac-
tions of private parties in some circumstances; this happens most no-
tably in the areas of international criminal and human rights law, 
precision and flexibility of treaty terms do not affect the legality of the treaty itself, but 
rather speak to the treaty’s substance.  Raustiala, supra note 14, at 588. 
91 Raustiala, supra note 14, at 585. 
92 Id. 
93 Id. at 584. 
94 Id. (quoting Downs, supra note 23, at 383). 
95 A state’s “preference” refers to the combination of “domestic preferences” (the 
aggregate preferences of domestic constituencies), “domestic institutions” (the 
branches of domestic governments that must approve an accord), and “relative state 
power” (the distribution of power among contracting states).  Raustiala, supra note 14, 
at 595-99. 
96 Id. at 595. 
97 Id. at 601.  Raustiala does not claim that every contract will result in shallow sub-
stance—only those dealing with a subject matter that is backed by a domestically weak 
group, which generally describes environmental interests.  Id. at 603 (“Environment 
and human rights accords are generally shallower than trade, investment, and arms 
control accords, in part because of the differential political power of the domestic 
groups that demand cooperation in these areas.  We generally observe a positive corre-
lation between depth and legality when the domestic demandeurs of cooperation are 
politically privileged, and a negative correlation when they are not.”). 
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where individuals can be held accountable internationally for the 
breach of a treaty provision.98  Other international frameworks regu-
late private parties indirectly instead, by binding states to implement 
the necessary regulations; the prominent example in this category is 
the WTO.99  For reasons of political feasibility,100 the NAAEC and 
CAFTA-DR environmental rules tend to follow the WTO model.101  
This understanding that international environmental regimes incen-
tivize state obedience, rather than directly targeting the conduct of in-
dividuals, informs the analysis of possible alternative mechanisms.  
The goal, then, is not to provide immediate relief or damage awards 
to the victims of specific instances of environmental malfeasance; such 
tort claims are generally handled by domestic courts.102  Rather, the 
immediate purpose of the international environmental dispute resolu-
tion mechanism is to ensure that states respect the international 
commitments they have made regarding environmental protection.103
98 See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Milosevic, Case No. IT-02-54-T, Amended Indictment,  
¶ 5 (Nov. 22, 2002), available at http://www.un.org/icty/indictment/english/ 
mil-ai040421-e.htm (accusing Slobodan Milosevic as an individual for the violation of 
international human rights law). 
99 See Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, annex 2, art. 3, Apr. 
15, 1994, 33 I.L.M. 1125 (stipulating that this dispute governs only the enumerated 
agreements, all of which are signed by, and binding on, states only). 
100 Regimes delegating substantive discretion to an international regulatory re-
gime are substantively deep, because doing so may require the enforcement of envi-
ronmental norms that are different than those the state would choose to enforce.  Ac-
cording to Raustiala, this is unlikely to happen in an environmental context, due to the 
weakness of domestic environmental groups.  See supra notes 96-97 and accompanying 
text. 
101 NAAEC and CAFTA-DR indicate that they are not meant to bind individuals as 
defendants, but rather to govern the actions of states.  The role of individuals and 
groups of individuals is limited to challenging governments’ compliance with the trea-
ties.  For instance, the treaties do not provide for damages to be paid by losing defen-
dants, see CAFTA-DR, supra note 1, art. 17.8 (indicating that the end result of a success-
ful submission is the publication of a factual record); NAAEC, supra note 5, art. 15.7 
(same), and any “person of a Party” has standing irrespective of whether she suffered 
any harm, see CAFTA-DR, supra note 1, art. 17.7(1) (stating that “[a]ny person of a 
Party may file a submission” under the environmental chapter); NAAEC, supra note 5, 
art. 14.1(f) (providing that a submission must be “filed by a person . . . in the territory 
of a Party”). 
102 See, e.g., Anderson v. Beatrice Foods Co., 129 F.R.D. 394, 395 (D. Mass. 1989) 
(recounting the claim by residents of Massachusetts against a corporation for negli-
gently “causing toxic waste to infiltrate the municipal water supply”), aff’d, 900 F.2d 
388 (1st Cir. 1990). 
103 Even though the primary goal of the environmental regime is to police state 
behavior with respect to environmental standards, this does not exclude a secondary, 
nonpreclusive goal of restitution to individuals who have been harmed by state nonen-
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Toward this objective, legality explains little about environmental 
agreements, due to the overwhelming preference among environmen-
talists for the formality and perceived security found in a written 
treaty.104  Theoretically, pledges might generate more effective envi-
ronmental protection, but until more states heed Raustiala’s recom-
mendation that they more frequently employ international pledges,105 
or until environmental interests can gain more domestic political 
clout, environmental regulations, like those in the NAAEC and 
CAFTA-DR, are likely to operate exclusively as international contracts. 
Similarly, the effect of structure on environmental agreements is 
limited.  Critics of CAFTA-DR and NAAEC tend to obfuscate the line 
between structure and substance in their commentaries.  Since these 
critics disapprove of both the environmental standards and the sub-
mission process established by the treaties, it seems that these view-
points assess both form and substance.  Nevertheless, these assertions 
are analytically distinct.  Arguments against the submission process 
have little to do with its existence or effectiveness in identifying cases 
of environmental nonenforcement, and, rather, denounce the struc-
ture because it is not “enforceable” by sufficiently substantial en-
forcement provisions.106  Thus, the structural arguments collapse into 
the substantive.  What remains are charges that the environmental 
provisions of NAAEC and CAFTA-DR lack adequate substantive depth 
to protect against the race to the bottom.  This trade-off between legal 
formality and substantive depth exactly parallels Raustiala’s analysis.107  
The “legal-substantive trade-off” adds the political feasibility of uni-
form standards and deep enforcement provisions to the list of factors 
necessary to effectively combat the environmental race to the bottom.  
This term is meant to capture the current reality that environmental 
forcement; it merely indicates that such recompense is not necessary to the regime’s 
purpose. 
104 See supra note 97 and accompanying text (noting that politically weak groups 
(like environmental groups) often insist that shallow agreements be reinforced with 
legal formality). 
105 See Raustiala, supra note 14, at 614 (“Scholars, statesmen, and activists alike 
have too often assumed that contracts are the best choice for cooperation, and pledges 
a feeble substitute.  But pledges can have surprising power.”). 
106 See, e.g., Tseming Yang, The Effectiveness of the NAFTA Environmental Side Agree-
ment’s Citizen Submission Process:  A Case Study of Metales y Derivados, 76 U. COLO. L. 
REV. 443, 458 (2005) (arguing that in the Metales case, the production of a factual re-
cord was ineffective in preventing the environmental harm); see also supra note 5 (dis-
cussing similar complaints by the Sierra Club). 
107 See supra notes 95-97 and accompanying text. 
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treaties in force are not simultaneously contractual and substantively 
deep; therefore, any environmental treaty (contractual by definition) 
must include shallow provisions to be considered politically feasible. 
Revisiting the two factors identified in Part I, it is clear that to cri-
tique the lack of uniform international environmental standards and 
seemingly unenforceable structural provisions in NAAEC and CAFTA-
DR is to attack the treaties’ substance.  Therefore, such arguments 
must be assessed in light of Raustiala’s legal-substantive trade-off.  
First, establishing specific international environmental standards is 
substantive in that such standards would provide explicit benchmarks 
for state action.  Second, the necessity of an effective private right of 
action is a misnomer; it is essentially a substantive requirement 
couched in terms of procedure.  To give binding legal effect to the 
right of action demands deeper substantive enforcement provisions 
that will remedy cases of nonconformity once they are identified by 
the action; this can only be achieved by deepening the treaty’s sub-
stance.  With a grasp of the variables, their goals, and the tradeoffs in-
volved, the inquiry now turns to whether an international environ-
mental regime can establish these two deep substantive measures, 
even though they are absent from the treaties’ explicit terms, while at 
the same time satisfying the third constraint of political feasibility. 
B.  Determining Political Feasibility in the NAAEC/CAFTA-DR Context 
Determining the effect of the legal-substantive trade-off on a given 
international agreement requires an assessment of what levels of form 
and substance are politically feasible in that specific context.108  To 
identify these preferences in the NAAEC/CAFTA-DR context, the lib-
eral theory of international relations—a view that recognizes the in-
ternational ramifications of domestic political actors’ preferences109—
proves informative.  Under this theory, the preferences expressed by 
parties to an international agreement reflect more than the wishes of 
the executive or her high-level agents and advisors, but are rather in-
108 Whether the terms of the CAFTA-DR environmental chapter are politically fea-
sible remains to be seen as the ratification process continues.  Because a majority of 
the signatories have already ratified the treaty, see supra note 8 and accompanying text, 
this Comment will assume its political feasibility.  NAAEC is already in force. 
109 See generally Andrew Moravcsik, Taking Preferences Seriously:  A Liberal Theory of 
International Politics, 51 INT’L ORG. 513, 513 (1997) (“Liberal [international relations] 
theory elaborates the insight that state-society relations—the relationship of states to 
the domestic and transnational social context in which they are embedded—have a 
fundamental impact on state behavior in world politics.”). 
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formed by the domestic political process and the interest groups that 
compete therein.110
As previously noted, most environmentalists prefer international 
agreements dealing with the environment to have a contractual 
form,111 and NAAEC and CAFTA-DR are no exception.  Treating le-
gality as a constant, the meaningful inquiry regarding political feasibil-
ity thus involves determining the level of substantive depth deemed 
acceptable by the contracting states.112  Logically, the deepest sub-
stance attainable in a multilateral treaty is the greatest depth that is 
mutually acceptable.113  Although this lowest-common-denominator 
approach114 contemplates an analysis of each state’s substantive pref-
erences, this Comment’s examination focuses solely on the United 
States’s popular and institutional preferences because they prove dis-
positive.115
An analysis of U.S. involvement in international environmental 
treaties reveals a persistent rejection of international environmental 
standards and strong enforcement provisions—both of which are es-
sential to inhibiting the environmental race to the bottom.  Beginning 
in the 1990s, a U.S. aversion to international environmental standards 
began to surface, as indicated by the political fight over the Kyoto Pro-
110 Id. at 518. 
111 See supra text accompanying note 97 (noting that contracts offer “formality and 
perceived security”). 
112 See supra note 14 and accompanying text.  Raustiala suggests that if pledges be-
came more acceptable, it would be possible to achieve deeper substance in interna-
tional environmental agreements.  Raustiala, supra note 14, at 610 (“By minimizing 
concerns about legal compliance, pledges may permit states to negotiate more ambi-
tious and deeper agreements that are tied to stricter monitoring and review provi-
sions.”). 
113 The mere fact that each state would agree to a certain level of substantive 
depth does not guarantee that this depth will be reflected in the agreement’s provi-
sions.  The variables of negotiating skill and the relative distributions of power and in-
terests, inter alia, will affect whether an agreement of the mutually preferred depth will 
actually be enacted. 
114 Because no party will contract for deeper substantive measures than are prefer-
able, the party with the most shallow preferences will dictate the level of substance that 
is politically feasible. 
115 This Comment does not go so far as to assert that the United States’s prefer-
ences are the shallowest among CAFTA-DR signatories, but it does claim that these 
preferences are dispositive because they rule out the possibility of including in CAFTA-
DR explicit substantive provisions that are deep enough to counteract the race to the 
bottom as described in Part I, supra.  This is not to say that there are no other politi-
cally feasible regimes possible, but it does indicate that anything approaching the sub-
stantive depth of these politically infeasible alternate provisions will not suffice. 
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tocol.116  Negotiated and signed by the Clinton administration,117 
Kyoto includes deep substantive provisions explicitly limiting the 
United States’s118 emission of greenhouse gases.119  In response to 
these terms, bipartisan protests in both the House120 and the Senate121 
assured President Clinton an embarrassing defeat if he were to send 
the Protocol to the Senate for ratification.  These protests proved fatal 
to any hopes of U.S. ratification, and therefore President Clinton did 
not present the Protocol to the Senate; the Bush administration later 
rejected it as a candidate for ratification.122
116 Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate 
Change, Dec. 11, 1997, available at http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/convkp/ 
kpeng.pdf [hereinafter Kyoto Protocol]. 
117 See Kyoto Protocol Status of Ratification (last modified on Dec. 13, 2006), 
http://unfccc.int/files/kyoto_protocol/background/status_of_ratification/applicatio
n/pdf/kp_rat_131206.pdf (listing the United States as a signatory as of December 11, 
1998, but noting that as of December 13, 2006, it had not yet ratified the Protocol). 
118 States who are party to Annex I of the United Nations Framework Convention 
on Climate Change, including the United States, see United Nations Framework Con-
vention on Climate Change, annex I, May 9, 1992, available at  http://unfccc.int/ 
resource/docs/convkp/conveng.pdf [hereinafter UNFCCC], would be subject to 
more onerous standards under the Kyoto Protocol than non-Annex I states if that pro-
tocol were to be adopted, see Kyoto Protocol, supra note 116, arts. 2-8 (listing the re-
sponsibilities of Annex I members). 
119 The standards established include specific references both to the gases covered 
by the Protocol and to state-specific commitment levels: 
The Parties included in Annex I shall, individually or jointly, ensure that their 
aggregate anthropogenic carbon dioxide equivalent emissions of the green-
house gases listed in Annex A do not exceed their assigned amounts, calcu-
lated pursuant to their quantified emission limitation and reduction com-
mitments inscribed in Annex B and in accordance with the provisions of this 
Article, with a view to reducing their overall emissions of such gases by at least 
5 per cent below 1990 levels in the commitment period 2008 to 2012. 
Kyoto Protocol, supra note 116, art. 3(1).  Annex A lists the gases covered:  carbon di-
oxide (CO2), methane (CH4), nitrous oxide (N2O), hydrofluorocarbons (HFCs), per-
fluorocarbons (PFCs), and sulphur hexafluoride (SF6).  Id. annex A.  Annex B sets the 
U.S. “[q]uantified emission limitation or reduction commitment” at 93% of the “base 
year or period.”  Id. annex B. 
120 H.R. Res. 211, 105th Cong. (1997).  This bill failed to emerge from the House 
Committee on International Relations Subcommittee on International Economic Pol-
icy and Trade, to which it was referred on August 21, 1997.  H. Res. 211, Latest Major 
Action, http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/bdquery/z?d105:HE00211:@@@x (last visited 
Mar. 23, 2007). 
121 S. Res. 98, 105th Cong. (1997) (enacted).  This resolution was adopted by a 
vote of 95-0 on July 25, 1997.  S. Res. 98, Latest Major Action, 
http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/bdquery/z?d105:SE00098:@@@x (last visited Mar. 23, 
2007). 
122 See U.S. Won’t Follow Climate Treaty Provisions, Whitman Says, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 28, 
2001, at A19 (recounting then-EPA Administrator Christine Todd Whitman’s state-
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Notwithstanding its avoidance of deep international environ-
mental standards, the United States has negotiated, signed, and even 
ratified treaties that set up strong environmental review structures 
such as the citizen submission processes found in both NAAEC and 
CAFTA-DR.123  The enforcement mechanisms attached to these struc-
tures, however, maintain the preference for a lack of explicit substan-
tive depth.124  NAAEC represents the first such structure to be em-
ployed in an American free trade agreement, and provides an 
example of the influence domestic interests can have on a state’s in-
ternational agreements.  Mobilized by a domestic environmental 
group’s pressure, well-placed members of Congress threatened the 
first President Bush’s fast track authority, prompting him to support 
the inclusion of environmental provisions in that treaty.125  Neverthe-
less, as the NAFTA negotiations drew to a close, the resultant text was 
ment that the Bush administration has “‘no interest in implementing that treaty’”).  
“Mrs. Whitman repeatedly noted that the Senate voted 95 to 0 against the United 
States’ taking any action on climate change unless developing countries also took 
measures to reduce their emissions of heat-trapping gases.”  Id. 
123 Note that Raustiala classifies citizen submission processes, like those found in 
NAAEC and CAFTA-DR, as “strong structures.”  See Raustiala, supra note 14, at 585 
(“Strong structures are those in which a central body issues a specific determination 
about a specific party.  Such determinations may concern compliance, based either on 
the body’s own investigations (a ‘police patrol’ system) or on claims of private actors (a 
‘fire alarm’ system).” (citing Raustiala, supra note 9, at 391)). 
124 As can be seen in comparing the run-up to NAAEC, see infra notes 125-128 and 
accompanying text, with the provisions of the Trade Act of 2002, see infra notes 129-133 
and accompanying text, the United States’s substantive preferences have not been stag-
nant.  Even so, the United States has never produced a substantively deep environ-
mental regime. 
125 Environmentalists began by transforming the heretofore routine vote on 
whether to grant the President “‘fast track’ authority to negotiate the NAFTA” into a 
debate over the agreement and its failure to address any environmental consequences.  
Frederick W. Mayer, Negotiating the NAFTA:  Political Lessons for the FTAA, in GREENING 
THE AMERICAS:  NAFTA’S LESSONS FOR HEMISPHERIC TRADE 97, 99 (Carolyn L. Deere & 
Daniel C. Esty eds., 2002). 
 Evidencing the environmentalists’ successes, “the two most important figures in 
Congress for trade legislation [at the time]—Dan Rostenkowski, chairman of the 
House Ways and Means Committee, and Lloyd Bentsen, chairman of the Senate Fi-
nance Committee—sent a letter to the president” notifying him that NAFTA must ad-
dress the environment if the fast track bill was to pass.  Id. at 100.  Then-House major-
ity leader Richard Gephardt also protested on behalf of both labor and environmental 
interests.  Id.  The Bush administration responded with an “Action Plan” that promised 
to address the environmental concerns in the free trade talks; this plan won over “sev-
eral major environmental organizations,” but failed to convince others.  Id. at 100-01. 
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bereft of any true environmental substantive depth.126  After unseating 
the incumbent, President Clinton assumed office with NAFTA’s ratifi-
cation still uncertain, but he soon mollified the environmentalist vot-
ers who had helped elect him127 by supporting a package deal, which 
included a corollary environmental side agreement that would correct 
NAFTA’s omissions.128
Unlike NAFTA, the negotiations of the CAFTA-DR agreement 
took place under a pre-existing grant of fast track authority that was 
not subject to imminent review,129 thus sparing the second President 
Bush from the more difficult legislative check that derailed his fa-
ther’s push for NAFTA ratification.130  Since the terms of the Trade 
Act of 2002 represent the most recent legislative statement on prefer-
ences for environmental provisions in trade agreements prior to 
CAFTA-DR’s negotiation, it is illuminating to analyze the terms with 
an eye to their substantive content.  While establishing no binding pa-
rameters for the substantive scope of environmental provisions, the 
Trade Act of 2002 lists approved objectives for consideration in the 
negotiation of trade agreements.131  Regarding the environment, the 
Trade Act’s substantive recommendations regarding environmental 
standards track almost exactly the terms of the CAFTA-DR environ-
mental chapter,132 but do not suggest a preferred structure or any sub-
126 See id. at 102-03 (noting that the first Bush administration did make some con-
cessions to the concern of environmental groups during the NAFTA negotiations, but 
the final NAFTA environmental standards remained fundamentally shallow and left 
many environmental groups far from satisfied). 
127 During the presidential campaign, environmental interests “pressed Clinton to 
insist on negotiating side agreements to ‘fix’ the NAFTA.”  Id. at 103. 
128 This side agreement is what eventually became NAAEC.  The main players in 
weakening the substance of enforcement provisions of the NAAEC’s citizen submission 
process were not domestic U.S. interests, but the other negotiating states, Canada and 
Mexico.  Raustiala, supra note 9, at 399. 
129 The Trade Act of 2002 was the fast track provision under which CAFTA-DR was 
negotiated, signed, and ratified.  Bipartisan Trade Promotion Authority Act of 2002  
§ 2105, 19 U.S.C. § 3805 (Supp. II 2002). 
130 The purpose of fast track legislation is to ease the negotiation of international 
treaties by temporarily relaxing the constitutional requirement that treaties are subject 
to a two-thirds vote of approval by the U.S. Senate.  U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.  Usu-
ally, the terms of fast track legislation disallow amendments to a treaty under consid-
eration and require only a simple majority vote in both houses.  See, e.g., Trade Act of 
2002 § 2105 (describing the procedures for congressional approval or disapproval of 
trade agreements). 
131 See Trade Act of 2002 § 2102(b)(1)-(11) (listing congressional preferences on a 
variety of subjects, including labor and the environment). 
132 Compare id. § 2102(b)(11)(A)-(B) (recording a legislative preference that states 
that are party to a trade agreement be accountable for effective enforcement of their 
  
2007] CITIZEN SUBMISSION PROCESS 1255 
  
 
stantive terms of enforcement.133  It is true that these provisions do not 
necessarily represent the views of both the House and the Senate 
when they ratified CAFTA-DR, and that some dissented from both the 
Trade Act134 and CAFTA-DR135 on environmental grounds, but the ob-
jectors were neither sufficiently influential nor numerous to deepen 
the substance of CAFTA-DR. 
As evidenced by the recent history of U.S. experience with envi-
ronmental and trade treaties, the tradeoff between legality and sub-
stance that Raustiala identified136 has proven true.  Each of these at-
tempts at international environmental regulation has either produced 
substantively shallow provisions, or failed to gain ratification because 
of political infeasibility.  Clearly, the United States currently prefers to 
deal in international environmental agreements exclusively through 
contractual means at the expense of substance. 
C.  Exemplifying Political Infeasibility 
Having demonstrated the parameters of political feasibility, this 
Section considers an example of a regime that would likely not win 
acceptance in such circumstances.  This discussion is meant only to 
own environmental laws, but reserving to those states the “discretion with respect to 
investigatory, prosecutorial, regulatory, and compliance matters and to make decisions 
regarding the allocation of resources to enforcement with respect to other . . . envi-
ronmental matters determined to have higher priorities”) with supra Part I.C (explain-
ing that CAFTA-DR member states are given the right to enforce their own environ-
mental laws as well as the right to sacrifice environmental protection in the pursuit of 
economic growth). 
133 Trade Act of 2002 § 2102(b)(11). 
134 See, e.g., 147 CONG. REC. H8973 (daily ed. Dec. 6, 2001) (statement of Rep. 
Hastings) (“Mr. Speaker, I am disappointed that the Trade Promotion Authority, for-
merly Fast Track, legislation completely ignores the legitimate concerns many people 
have raised about the negative impact of current trade policies on working families, 
the environment, family farmers, consumers, small- and mid-sized businesses, people 
of color and women here in the United States and around the world.”).  But see, e.g., 
148 CONG. REC. S9107-08 (2002) (daily ed. Sept. 24, 2002) (statement of Sen. Grassley) 
(challenging the notion that the Trade Act of 2002 should require the President to 
accept at least parallel environmental terms to those included in the Jordan Free 
Trade Agreement). 
135 See, e.g., 151 CONG. REC. S7728 (daily ed. June 30, 2005) (statement of Sen. 
Levin) (“I am disappointed by the weak labor and environmental provisions included 
in CAFTA.  Writing labor and environmental standards into trade agreements is an 
important way to ensure that free trade is fair trade. But unlike the 2001 Jordan Free 
Trade Agreement, CAFTA fails to include internationally recognized, core labor stan-
dards.”). 
136 See supra notes 16-21 and accompanying text. 
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illustrate a politically infeasible regime, and by no means argues that 
every alternative to the NAAEC/CAFTA-DR environmental regime is 
politically infeasible.  The intent here is to more concretely describe 
characteristics that would remove a regime from the realm of political 
feasibility in this context. 
A simple and intuitive means of empowering the environmental 
interests under NAAEC or CAFTA-DR would be to grant conventional 
standing137 in an international forum to those parties who are specifi-
cally harmed by an instance of environmental non-enforcement, in-
cluding individuals, and allow them to make claims against the offend-
ing states for binding relief.138  While in some exceptional 
international situations regimes of supranational adjudication have 
flourished, similar preconditions for their success are absent in most 
international relationships,139 and in the NAAEC/CAFTA-DR context, 
this solution is politically unworkable. 
The archetypal regime of supranational adjudication is the Euro-
pean Union’s (EU) system,140 headed by the European Court of Jus-
137 Conventional notions of standing include the ability of any individual, on her 
own behalf, to be party to a dispute.  This ability is a distinguishing factor of what is 
termed “supranational” adjudication.  See Laurence R. Helfer & Anne-Marie Slaughter, 
Toward a Theory of Effective Supranational Adjudication, 107 YALE L.J. 273, 277 (1997) (de-
fining traditional international adjudication as “the power to adjudicate state-to-state 
disputes,” and supranational adjudication as including “cases involving private parties 
litigating directly against state governments or against each other”). 
138 I limit the scope of consideration here to states as defendants, presuming that 
any cases brought against the individuals, natural or juridical, who caused the pollu-
tion would be brought in domestic court.  Also, instances of environmental nonen-
forcement, by definition, are perpetrated by state actors. 
139 For a heated academic debate concerning the effectiveness of supranational 
regimes, see Helfer & Slaughter, supra note 137, at 276 (arguing that the European sys-
tem, composed of both the European Court of Justice (ECJ) and the European Court 
of Human Rights (ECHR), evidences the possible effectiveness of supranational adju-
dication); Eric A. Posner & John C. Yoo, Judicial Independence in International Tribunals, 
93 CAL. L. REV. 1, 7 (2005) (disputing the effectiveness of “independent tribunals”—
those composed of jurists not beholden to state interests—and asserting that such tri-
bunals “pose a danger to international cooperation because they can render decisions 
that conflict with the interests of state parties”); Laurence R. Helfer & Anne-Marie 
Slaughter, Why States Create International Tribunals:  A Response to Professors Posner & Yoo, 
93 CAL. L. REV. 901, 902 (2005) (arguing that independent tribunals play a legitimiz-
ing role in international relations and are also constrained by various mechanisms ac-
cording to states’ wishes); Eric A. Posner & John C. Yoo, Reply to Helfer & Slaughter, 93 
CAL. L. REV. 957, 958 (2005) (criticizing Helfer and Slaughter’s reliance on the ECJ 
and ECHR in deriving a model for a successful international tribunal and noting the 
general decline of the ICJ over recent years). 
140 Helfer & Slaughter, supra note 137, at 387. 
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tice (ECJ).141  Within the subject matter it addresses, the EU example 
typifies characteristics common to supranational regimes:  legal con-
tractuality, structural strength, and substantive depth.  First, the con-
tractual nature of the EU court system derives from its explicit estab-
lishment in the EC Treaty.142  Structurally, the ECJ is an appellate 
court which is able to hear cases concerning interpretation of the EC 
Treaty or the increasingly comprehensive body of European Union 
legislation.  Certain EU laws have been deemed “directly effective,” 
thus allowing the supranational court to hear the claims of individuals 
concerning these provisions.143  Demonstrating the system’s substan-
tive depth, the ECJ issues binding decisions144—which are generally 
well respected by member state courts—that often find against the in-
terest of an EU member state,145 thus forcing that state to change its 
practice in conformity with the EU legal norm. 
However successful supranational adjudication has been for the 
EU, to assert a fortiori that the system will win acceptance among the 
CAFTA-DR states ignores the obvious gap between what is politically 
feasible among EU member states and among the CAFTA-DR signato-
ries.  The United States will not likely adopt binding uniform interna-
141 See Consolidated Version of the Treaty Establishing the European Community 
(Treaty of Rome), art. 7, Dec. 24, 2002, 2002 O.J. (C 325) 33 [hereinafter EC Treaty] 
(establishing the institutions of the European Community, including a “Court of Jus-
tice”).  The ECJ has the general jurisdiction to “ensure that in the interpretation and 
application of [the EC] Treaty the law is observed.”  Id. art. 220. 
142 See EC Treaty, supra note 141, art. 7 (listing a “Court of Justice” among the 
community’s institutions), arts. 220, 225 (establishing the Court of First Instance). 
143 See, e.g., Case 26/62, Van Gend en Loos v. Nederlandse Administratie der Be-
lastingen, 1963 E.C.R 1, 7 (1962) (finding that certain articles of the EC Treaty can be 
directly applicable by virtue of the treaty’s establishment of a legal order that is com-
prised both of states and citizens). 
144 See EC Treaty, supra note 141, art. 228, § 1 (“If the Court of Justice finds that a 
Member State has failed to fulfill an obligation under this Treaty, the State shall be 
required to take the necessary measures to comply with the judgment of the Court of 
Justice.”); id. arts. 244, 256 (establishing the enforceability of ECJ decisions and the 
procedures pertaining thereto). 
145 See, e.g., Case 115/78, Knoors v. Sec’y of State for Econ. Affairs, 1979 E.C.R. 
399, 406, 411 (finding in favor of a Dutch national living in Belgium who appealed the 
Netherlands’ decision to deny his application for a Dutch business license in contra-
vention of a Community directive).  History has shown that not every member state’s 
courts will wholly defer to the ECJ’s judgments.  See, e.g., Brunner v. Eur. Union Treaty, 
1 C.M.L.R. 57, 79 (1994) (exemplifying the German Federal Constitutional Court’s 
deference to the ECJ’s adjudication of individual fundamental rights as long as that 
interpretation is consistent with the German constitution). 
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tional environmental standards,146 yet a supranational regime would 
by definition necessitate such a standard.147  Additionally, the United 
States has shown through its demonstrated preferences that it is not 
receptive to international standards that compel action which it would 
not otherwise be willing to take,148 as has been the practice in the 
paradigmatic EU example.149  Clearly, a supranational system in the 
mode of the EU adopts substantive provisions that are far deeper than 
the United States would implement on its own to deal with environ-
mental concerns. 
III.  ALARMS AND NETWORKS:  EXPLICITLY SHALLOW, POTENTIALLY DEEP 
As discussed in Part I, a satisfactory solution to the problem of en-
vironmental protection would involve both a mechanism for enforc-
ing the citizen submission process and uniform standards of environ-
mental protection.150  Part II adds to this analysis the constraint of 
political feasibility—the idea that any proposed enforcement mecha-
nisms and uniform standards must be palatable to the preferences of 
the contracting parties in order to enter into force.151  This Part ar-
gues that NAAEC and CAFTA-DR provide for systems that, in the 
hands of politically astute NGOs, are sufficient to counteract the envi-
ronmental race to the bottom in such a way as to provide the neces-
sary substantive protections in a politically feasible manner.152
The NAAEC and CAFTA-DR citizen submission processes, rather 
than serving as court-like means for rights protection and enforce-
ment, act as “fire alarms” that alert the public and signatory govern-
146 See supra notes 116-122 and accompanying text. 
147 The act of making a dichotomous decision sets an international standard with 
which the court expects states to comply, whether they actually do or not.  See Helfer & 
Slaughter, supra note 137, at 289-90. 
148 See supra notes 116-122 and accompanying text (describing the unwillingness of 
Congress to accept the Kyoto treaty as signed and negotiated by the Clinton admini-
stration). 
149 Whether or not the EU is representative of other supranational adjudicatory 
regimes on this point is up for debate.  See supra note 139. 
150 See supra Part I.C. 
151 See supra Part II.A. 
152 This Comment does not claim that this is the only environmental regime that is 
sufficient to stem the race to the bottom and achieve political feasibility, but rather 
analyzes the treaties’ terms as a vehicle for understanding a possible solution to the 
legal-substantive tradeoff.  See supra note 115. 
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ments to the need for regulatory change.153  It is the province of en-
terprising NGOs to help trip the alarm by bringing these submissions 
in a manner that puts the most political pressure on the member 
states to respond.  But simply motivating national regulatory reform is 
only half the job; haphazard reform alone is no cure for the environ-
mental race to the bottom.  Anne-Marie Slaughter provides a theory 
for how regulatory networks—groups of domestic environmental min-
isters154 such as CAFTA-DR’s Environmental Affairs Council (EAC)155 
and Environmental Cooperation Commission (ECC)156—help harmo-
nize international standards through the generation and dissemina-
tion of credible information among the participating government of-
ficials.157  Systems such as the citizen submission process can help 
encourage harmonization of regulatory approaches by first producing 
information regarding specific regulatory failures, thus mobilizing 
public support for, and government interest in, addressing the is-
sue.158  Slaughter claims that international regulatory networks can 
then encourage the state addressing the specific failure to do so in a 
manner consistent with the regulatory approaches used in the other 
network member states.159  Harmonization emerges as the regulators, 
conforming to the practical advice of their international peers, use 
their domestic authority as national-level administrators to implement 
the new standard international response.160
153 See Raustiala, supra note 9, at 389, 393, 398 (classifying the NAAEC submission 
procedure as a “review institution” analogous to a “fire alarm”–a decentralized system 
that co-opts private watchdogs to alert government institutions to the need for re-
form). 
154 See ANNE MARIE SLAUGHTER, A NEW WORLD ORDER 36-64 (2004) (introducing 
the concept of regulatory networks). 
155 See supra note 84. 
156 See supra note 84. 
157 See SLAUGHTER, supra note 154 at 177-78, 187-88 (stressing the role of regula-
tory networks in generating information critical to government reform); see generally id. 
at 1-35 (introducing the author’s theory of state disaggregation and establishing a tax-
onomy of networks). 
158 Id. at 189-91. 
159 Id. at 20, 59-61. 
160 Id. at 132, 145, 168-69, 178; see also José E. Alvarez, The New Dispute Settlers:  
(Half) Truths and Consequences, 38 TEX. INT’L L.J. 405, 421 (2003) (citing Christine 
Chinkin, Normative Development in the International Legal System, in COMMITMENT AND 
COMPLIANCE:  THE ROLE OF NON-BINDING NORMS IN THE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL 
SYSTEM 21, 30 (Dinah Shelton ed., 2000) (discussing “soft,” or nonbinding, law that 
can “guide the application of hard [binding] law”)). 
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The following Section analyzes the NAAEC and CAFTA-DR provi-
sions in light of Slaughter’s model.  It argues that the treaties incorpo-
rate Slaughter’s vision by establishing environmental regimes that 
combat the race to the bottom by (1) relying on private entities and 
NGOs as a means of identifying regulatory gaps, (2) encouraging in-
stitutional change among member states, resulting in a harmonized 
approach with broad applicability, and (3) remaining within the 
bounds of political feasibility.  Because the NAAEC and CAFTA-DR 
provisions are functionally identical, the arguments referencing 
NAAEC citizen submission cases demonstrate that both treaties have 
the capacity to meet this challenge. 
A.  The Private Right of Action:  A Tool for Political Pressure 
The aim of the environmental submission process is not to grant 
legal recourse for individuals who have suffered an environmental 
harm, but to provide a forum that enables private parties to help iden-
tify gaps in state environmental regulations.161  Both treaties use the 
same procedure, a key component of which grants standing to NGOs 
based in any member state to bring claims against member states for 
environmental non-enforcement.162  Two NAAEC factual records, 
Metales y Derivados (Metales)163 and Cruise Ship Pier Project in Cozumel, 
Quintana Roo (Cozumel),164 show that NGOs can use this standing pro-
vision to gain the ear of officials capable of addressing their con-
cerns.165
161 CAFTA-DR and NAAEC both provide for claims based on domestic govern-
mental nonenforcement of environmental laws and regulations on the books.  CAFTA-
DR, supra note 1, art. 17.7(1); NAAEC, supra note 5, art. 14(1).  Criticism of the sub-
mission process based on the lack of institutional change in response to the identified 
environmental harm misunderstands the purpose of the submission process itself, 
which is merely to identify domestic nonenforcement.  See Raustiala, supra note 9, at 
389 (defining the role of review institutions in international governance). 
162 See supra notes 73-75 and accompanying text.  There is no requirement that 
domestic remedies be exhausted before claimants have recourse to either the NAAEC 
or CAFTA-DR submission process.  See CAFTA-DR, supra note 1, art. 17.   
163 Secretariat for the N. Am. Comm. for Envtl. Cooperation, Final Factual Record 
in re Metales y Derivados, SEM-98-007 (Feb. 7, 2002) [hereinafter Metales], available at 
http://www.cec.org/files/pdf/sem/98-7-FFR-e.pdf. 
164 Secretariat for the N. Am. Comm. for Envtl. Cooperation, Final Factual Record 
in re Cruise Ship Pier Project in Cozumel, Quintana Roo, SEM-96-001 (Oct. 24, 1997) 
[hereinafter Cozumel], available at http://www.cec.org/files/pdf/sem/ACF17D1.PDF. 
165 Both of these cases were originally brought by NGOs.  See Metales, supra note 
163, at 9; Cozumel, supra note 164, at 6.  It is important for NGOs motivated by political 
goals to instigate submissions, because any individuals who are harmed either physi-
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In Metales, the Environmental Health Coalition and Comité Ciu-
dadano Pro Restauración del Cañón del Padre y Servicios Comuni-
tarios, A.C., brought a submission in response to residents’ complaints 
of environmental contamination.  They argued to the NAAEC Secre-
tariat that Mexico had failed to “enforce its environmental law effec-
tively in the case of [an] abandoned lead smelter . . . in Tijuana.”166  
After an investigation, the Secretariat concluded that the waste recy-
cling facility in question had been abandoned,167 that the residual 
waste had not been properly sequestered or disposed of,168 and that 
the situation endangered both the local ecosystem and human life.169  
Additionally, the Secretariat found that the plant’s operators had fled 
to the United States in order to avoid prosecution under Mexican 
law.170  Although contaminants remained at the site as of 2004, the 
submission process has helped to publicize the situation.171
Similarly, although the Cozumel case did not end the way the com-
plainants would have hoped, NAAEC enabled them to bring wide-
spread public attention to their issue.  In that case, controversy arose 
over plans to construct a pier, a component of the larger “port termi-
nal project,” when environmental groups learned that the project en-
dangered parts of a coral reef.172  The groups claimed that the Mexi-
can government violated its own environmental laws when it failed to 
assess the environmental impact of the project prior to commencing 
construction of the pier.173  In the short term, the complainants won 
both the public’s attention and a voluntary moratorium on further 
construction in the area, pending the outcome of the NAAEC Secre-
cally or financially by a member state’s nonenforcement of its environmental provi-
sions have no substantive remedy available from the submission process, and therefore 
little incentive to bring a submission on their own behalf. 
166 Metales, supra note 163, at 13; see also Yang, supra note 106, at 444 (noting that 
residents of the area complained about the contamination for years). 
167 Metales, supra note 163, at 22-23. 
168 Id. at 23-24. 
169 Id. at 35-40. 
170 See id. at 14 (noting that the submission asserted that Mexico is not enforcing 
its criminal sanctions against the owners who had fled to the United States). 
171 See, e.g., Yang, supra note 106, at 456-57 (acknowledging that the NAAEC sub-
mission procedure promoted transparency in the Metales submission, but arguing that 
the submission process ultimately failed because it did not sufficiently shame the Mexi-
can government into implementing appropriate reforms to address the problem). 
172 Cozumel, supra note 164, at 8-9. 
173 Id. at 8-10. 
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tariat’s investigation.174  Despite the factual record’s finding of evi-
dence that the pier, if completed, would irreparably damage the coral 
reefs,175 construction resumed after the factual record’s publication.176
Given the results of these cases, it is difficult to argue that the 
submission system is useful to domestic environmental interests and 
not a fruitless exercise.  The liberal theory of international relations, 
however, makes the political value in such a process more obvious.  A 
look at the three bases of the liberal theory suggests that any venue for 
issue advocacy that garners attention from both the public and office-
holders will aid an advocate seeking to enhance her domestic political 
standing.  First, the liberal theory assumes that “[t]he fundamental ac-
tors in international politics are individuals and private groups,”177 
who then, according to the theory’s second basic assumption, shape 
the political preferences of the state through the domestic political 
process.178  Finally, the theory claims that the aggregate of “interde-
pendent state preferences” instructs the state’s behavior on the inter-
national stage.179  Along these lines, Metales and Cozumel show how the 
submission process allows environmental groups to formally protest 
the regulatory decisions of a state.  These claims can be leveraged to 
advance the claimants’ domestic political agenda, and therefore affect 
governmental preferences and international behavior through the 
domestic political process.  In both Metales and Cozumel, the claimants, 
though dissatisfied with the specific outcomes, used an international 
venue to draw attention to their concerns, thus bringing regional and 
international pressures to bear on the nonenforcing state.  Such in-
ternational attention can be parlayed into domestic political gains 
through skillful public relations techniques, and these gains can be 
used to affect both the state’s domestic and international environ-
mental policies. 
Whether or not claims of environmental nonenforcement win 
immediate remedy from the delinquent state in the specific circum-
stances giving rise to the submission matters little when compared to 
the political value conferred upon the complainant.  Even though the 
submission process failed to clean up the lead smelter in Metales or 
protect the reef in Cozumel, the submissions’ ability to capture the 
174 Graubart, supra note 9, at 437-38. 
175 Cozumel, supra note 164, at 37-38. 
176 Graubart, supra note 9, at 439. 
177 Moravcsik, supra note 109, at 516. 
178 Id. at 518. 
179 Id. at 520. 
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public eye, and to use that publicity to push for environmental policy 
changes, exemplifies the political pressure the submission process can 
afford to domestic environmental interests. 
B.  Networks and the Harmonization of Environmental Standards 
The treaties’ “alarm” function is not the problem critics generally 
cite when calling for more effective environmental protections.  More 
common is the claim that the environmental chapter should provide 
binding protections similar to those given to foreign investment and 
trade interests.180  Nevertheless, to view environmental protection as a 
court-like proceeding misconstrues the approach adopted in both 
CAFTA-DR and NAAEC.  Rightly understood, these provisions estab-
lish not a forum for international adjudication of legal rights, but a 
means for challenging domestic political decisions by raising the issue 
before an international body of domestic regulators.181  In so doing, 
the process affords NGOs the opportunity to spur the harmonization 
of laws, producing stronger domestic regulations. 
Cozumel provides an example of Slaughter’s regulatory networks in 
action.  The proceedings themselves embarrassed the Mexican gov-
ernment, which agreed to the factual record’s publication only under 
heavy pressure from the NAAEC Representatives of the United States 
and Canada.182  Additionally, the media attention that the case won 
within Mexico, while failing to derail the pier’s construction, pres-
sured the government into making future environmental concessions.  
As Jonathan Graubart notes: 
the petition brought considerable international spotlight on faulty envi-
ronmental practices in Mexico, increased local debate on such matters, 
and forced Mexico to improve its oversight procedures with respect to 
future developmental projects, making them more transparent.  The 
Mexican Government did, in fact, promise to improve its laws on pro-
180 See, e.g., Kibel, supra note 5, at 479 (proposing that North American environ-
mental law be enforced on par with North American trade law). 
181 In the CAFTA-DR context, this international regulatory network would be the 
EAC, CAFTA-DR, supra note 1, art. 17.5, or the ECC, Environmental Cooperation 
Agreement, supra note 84, art. IV, both of which are composed of federal environ-
mental regulators, or their equivalent, from each member state. 
182 See Graubart, supra note 9, at 437-38 (noting that the issue became embarrass-
ing for the Mexican government). 
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tecting endangered coral reefs and to develop a new environmental plan 
for the Cozumel island.
183
Thus the complainants, though unable to achieve a victory in the con-
troversy at issue, were able to use the international submission process 
to force the Mexican government to adhere more closely to interna-
tional norms concerning environmental regulation. 
The BC Aboriginal Fisheries Commission et al. (BC Hydro) factual re-
cord184 also shows how the submission process can achieve interna-
tional harmonization in environmental regulatory procedures.  In this 
case, the submission claimed that Canada failed to enforce the Cana-
dian Fisheries Act by allowing BC Hydro to build dams that disrupted 
protected species’ habitats.185  In coordination with this submission, 
the claimants publicized the case internationally, and added U.S. co-
sponsors to the complaint.186  In the end, the factual record favored 
the complainants, questioning the effectiveness of Canada’s enforce-
ment measures embodied in the Water Use Planning Initiative 
(WUP).187  On top of this, the complainants, with the help of diplo-
matic pressure from the United States, secured assurances from the 
Canadian government that would accelerate the WUP’s introduction 
into force and strengthen its “sanctioning authority.”188
From these cases, it is clear that a politically aware environmental-
ist group can use the submission process as a coercive lobbying tool to 
bring an unwanted spotlight upon government officials.  By harness-
ing peer pressure from other environmental regulators, the process 
can produce a uniform international standard for environmental pro-
183 Id. at 439 (internal citations omitted). 
184 Secretariat for the N. Am. Comm. for Envtl. Cooperation, Final Factual Record 
in re BC Aboriginal Fisheries Comm. et al., SEM-97-001, at 4 (May 30, 2000)  
[hereinafter BC Hydro], available at http://www.cec.org/files/pdf/sem/ 
BC-Hydr-Fact-record_en.pdf  (recounting the submission’s allegation that BC Hydro 
“‘consistently and routinely violated [federal Fisheries Act] section 35(1)’”). 
185 Id. at 1 (recording a submission brought on behalf of NGOs, including the 
Trail Wildlife Association, the Sierra Club, and the Pacific Coast Federation of Fisher-
men’s Association, inter alia). 
186 See Graubart, supra note 9, at 440-41 (describing the use of American co-
submitters “including the national Sierra Club in hopes of attracting greater interna-
tional attention”). 
187 BC Hydro, supra note 184, at 111-12; see also Graubart, supra note 9, at 442.  The 
WUP is a Canadian regulatory instrument dealing with water use and fish habitats.  BC 
Hydro, supra note 184, at 11-12. 
188 See Graubart, supra note 9, at 443 (noting that the public attention “helped 
spur the government into instituting the WUP process and in giving it more sanction-
ing authority”). 
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tection.  Furthermore, it is dangerous to view environmental regula-
tion as a “product” rather than a “process” because regulation “is not 
fully contained in the statutory text; it is the complex outcome of the 
interaction between agency implementation, private-party challenges, 
judicial interpretation, and legislative reaction.”189  To impose court-
like enforcement powers against states for failing to prosecute every 
instance of environmental noncompliance is to be ignorant of the it-
erative regulatory process.  Indeed, even within the United States, 
nonenforcement routinely prevails in the name of practical expedi-
ency and optimistic legislative goal setting.190  A powerful suprana-
tional agency, wielding powerful investigative and sanctioning abili-
ties, will not induce compliance by the states subject to its oversight.  
Rather, it will encourage those states to shrink the scope of their do-
mestic environmental regulations in order to prevent liability, result-
ing in an overall decrease in substantive environmental protection.191
In sum, the environmental submission processes found in the 
NAAEC and CAFTA-DR treaties establish a means of giving effect to 
domestic regulation in a political atmosphere.  The tools available to 
potential claimants have the power to instigate harmonization by chal-
lenging domestic practices that operate below the international norm.  
Once secured, these reforms will affect not only the complainants 
themselves, but will apply throughout the legal regime. 
C.  Networks and Political Feasibility 
The innovation of the “alarms and networks” system of environ-
mental enforcement is one of political feasibility.  As noted in Part II, 
the legal-substantive tradeoff indicates that environmental treaties 
usually have substantively shallow provisions.  Given that the NAAEC 
and CAFTA-DR signatories192 have already chosen to implement ex-
plicitly shallow provisions, the question then becomes whether the 
post-ratification deepening of the treaties’ substance remains politi-
cally feasible.  This Section argues that the networked system and its 
189 Kal Raustiala, The Political Implications of the Enforcement Provisions of the NAFTA 
Environmental Side Agreement:  The CEC as a Model for Future Accords, 25 ENVTL. L. 31, 48-
49 (1995). 
190 See id. at 51 (citing the persistent nonattainment of emissions standards in Los 
Angeles). 
191 See id. at 52 (arguing that the use of a supranational agency like the CEC would 
encourage Congress to reduce the scope of its environmental laws). 
192 Recall that not all signatories have ratified CAFTA-DR, see supra note 8. 
  
1266 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 155: 1229 
 
use of domestically accountable officials, combined with the 
NAAEC/CAFTA-DR Secretariats’ respect for state sovereignty, ensure 
that the regulatory changes the system produces will be domestically 
legitimate. 
The beauty of regulatory networks is that their composition pro-
vides democratic accountability:  these networks are composed of state 
officials who already control a specific sector of the domestic govern-
ment.193  By treating agency heads and cabinet-level officials as the 
chief diplomatic officers within their substantive policy areas, Slaugh-
ter argues, states can “ensur[e] that transgovernmental networks are 
subject to at least the same checks and balances as national officials 
acting within national territory.”194  In the same way that the networks 
co-opt regulators’ authority to implement regulatory harmonization, 
they benefit from the accountability that those same regulators owe to 
their state governments.195  A complicating factor in the case of 
CAFTA-DR is the possibility that not all member states may have suffi-
cient regulatory infrastructures to be represented in such networks in 
the first place.196  Answering this deficiency, the CAFTA-DR talks 
themselves have produced regulatory advancement among the nego-
tiating parties, such that Central American states lacking the equiva-
lent of a cabinet-level environmental minister have established interim 
regimes through which Slaughter’s networked governance can oper-
ate.197
193 See SLAUGHTER, supra note 154, at 231 (arguing that if governments send their 
own appointed or elected officials to serve on these transnational networks, then they 
will be accepting of the networks’ output because of the retention of state accountabil-
ity).  Such is the case with both the EAC and the ECC.  See CAFTA-DR, supra note 1, 
art. 17.5; Environmental Cooperation Agreement, supra note 84, art. IV. 
194 SLAUGHTER, supra note 154, at 231. 
195 See id. at 232-33 (“[O]ne set of government officials operates at both the na-
tional and global-regional levels performing a set of interrelated functions, but these 
officials would have to represent both national and global interests . . . .”).  Kenneth 
Anderson challenges Slaughter’s conception of accountability in the context of trans-
governmental regulatory networks.  See Kenneth Anderson, Squaring the Circle?  Reconcil-
ing Sovereignty and Global Governance Through Global Government Networks, 118 HARV. L. 
REV. 1255, 1303 (2005) (book review) (“But plainly the argument of A New World Order 
depends crucially on judges and bureaucrats—unelected and, at best, only partially 
democratically accountable actors—relying on their own perception of their authority 
in order to bind the states of which they are nominally a part.”). 
196 See Graubert, supra note 9, at 437-38 (giving an example of Mexico’s insuffi-
cient regulatory infrastructure). 
197 See Implementation of the Dominican Republic-Central America Free Trade Agreement:  
Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Ways & Means, 109th Cong. 14, 21 (2005) (statement of 
the Hon. Peter F. Allgeier, Acting U.S. Trade Rep., Off. of the U.S. Trade Rep.) 
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In addition to the network’s accountability, the Secretariat’s use of 
discretion has demonstrated, in the context of NAAEC, that the sub-
mission process can operate in a manner respectful of state sover-
eignty.  Raustiala argues that, in refusing to investigate two specific 
submissions, the Secretariat made “sound” decisions that evinced a 
“politically astute” understanding of the submission process’s relation 
to domestic regulatory methods.198  Both the Biodiversity Submission199 
and the Sierra Club Submission200 challenged legislative amendments to 
U.S. environmental laws as, in effect, failures to enforce the preexist-
ing environmental standards.201  In each instance, the Secretariat de-
cided to forego investigation of these rollbacks, noting that subse-
quent environmental legislation that diminishes the effectiveness of 
existing environmental law will not be considered a failure to en-
force.202  Raustiala points out that these decisions rightly interpret the 
(“Nicaragua has created a new office on trade and environment within its environment 
ministry as the result of the CAFTA, while El Salvador has established a new advisory 
committee on trade and environment issues, with NGOs on the committee, very much 
like our own Trade and Environment Policy Advisory Committee (TEPAC).  In fact, 
the Environment Chapter requires all of the CAFTA-DR countries to establish such 
advisory committees.”).  The terms to which the signatories have agreed include the 
assurance that there will be meetings among cabinet-level environmental regulators, 
and that each state will establish an environmental consultative or advisory committee 
to implement environmental regulations.  CAFTA-DR supra note 1, art. 17.5, 17.6(3). 
198 See Kal Raustiala, International “Enforcement of Enforcement” Under the North Ameri-
can Agreement on Environmental Cooperation, 36 VA. J. INT’L L. 721, 722-23 (1996) (“The 
analysis herein supports the [CEC] Secretariat’s responses, arguing that the decisions 
are sound, both under the terms of the Agreement and under the separation of pow-
ers doctrine of the United States.  Moreover, as this Article argues, the decisions 
handed down by the Secretariat are politically astute . . . .”). 
199 Secretariat for the N. Am. Comm. for Envtl. Cooperation, Petition Pursuant to 
Article 14 of the North American Agreement on Environmental Cooperation, at 6, SEM-95-001 
(June 30, 1995) (submitted by Jay Tutchton, Earthlaw), available at 
http://www.cec.org/files/pdf/sem/95-1-SUB-EO.pdf  [hereinafter Biodiversity Submis-
sion] (claiming that the United States “cannot simply halt enforcement of the ESA . . . 
without violating its obligations under the NAAEC”). 
200 Secretariat for the N. Am. Comm. for Envtl. Cooperation, Submission Pursuant to 
Article 14 of the North American Agreement on Environmental Cooperation on the U.S. Logging 
Rider, at 1, SEM-95-002 (Aug. 30, 1995) (submitted by Patti A. Goldman, Sierra Club 
Legal Defense Fund), available at http://www.cec.org/files/pdf/sem/ACF151.pdf 
[hereinafter Sierra Club Submission] (arguing that the U.S. government failed to en-
force its environmental laws governing logging on federal lands). 
201 Biodiversity Submission, supra note 199, at 4; Sierra Club Submission, supra note 
200, at 3. 
202 See Secretariat for the N. Am. Comm. for Envtl. Cooperation, Secretariat’s Deter-
mination Pursuant to Articles 14 & 15 of the North American Agreement on Environmental Co-
operation, at 4-5, SEM-95-002 (Dec. 8, 1995), available at www.cec.org/files/pdf/ 
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terms of NAAEC,203 and also reflect the correct understanding of envi-
ronmental regulation as an iterative process that cannot be easily 
separated from legislative action.204  In this way, both the submission 
process and the officials managing the process respect the sovereignty 
of the signatory states.  Such respect does not weaken the process, but 
rather strengthens it, because the international regime cannot func-
tion without the cooperation of its constituent governments. 
As the NAAEC process demonstrates, the submission procedure, 
in upholding standards of environmental protection, must rely on 
both the internal legitimacy of networking officials as well as the self-
limiting discretion of the institutions. 
CONCLUSION 
CAFTA-DR provides for a networked solution to the international 
environmental regulatory problem.  The treaty’s provisions have the 
potential to combat the diminution of environmental standards that 
might otherwise occur as a result of the increased international in-
vestment and trade that NAFTA and CAFTA-DR intend to achieve.  In 
doing so, the submission process and regulatory network provide a 
system of international accountability that can use private actors to in-
stigate proceedings, which produces the harmonization of standards 
in a politically acceptable manner.  This system provides shrewd envi-
ronmentalists an instrument for enhancing their domestic political 
status as a means to effect regulatory change. 
 
sem/95-2-DET-OE.pdf (“Where the new law explicitly exempts, modifies, or waives 
provisions of an earlier law—enacted law will prevail.”); Letter from Victor Lichtinger, 
Executive Director, Comm. For Envtl. Cooperation, to Jay Tutchton, Staff Attorney, 
Earthlaw 4-6 (Sept. 21, 1995), available at http://www.cec.org/files/pdf/sem/ 
95-1-DET-E1.PDF (“[T]he provisions of Article 14 are most logically triggered when a 
failure to enforce is brought about by administrative shortcomings rather than legisla-
tive mandates.”). 
203 See Raustiala, supra note 198, at 757 (arguing that in rejecting these submis-
sions, the Secretariat rightly read NAAEC to exclude claims against congressional “re-
scissions bills and their attendant riders” despite the danger this legislation poses to 
the environment). 
204 See id. at 758 (“In the complex regulatory system, enforcement cannot be read-
ily separated from lawmaking in practice.  In the United States, administrative agencies 
engage in both lawmaking and enforcement as part and parcel of the modern admin-
istrative state.”). 
